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The geographical allocation of Spanish aid has been little studied, despite the fact that it is 
unusually concentrated on middle-income countries. This paper sets out a model of Spanish 
ODA policy based on an integrated approach reflecting recipient needs and donor interests 
with an aim of analysing the “censored” nature of aid-partner selection and quota allocation. 
The results show that Spain has followed a hybrid pattern involving recipient needs, but 
where self-interest predominates and performance criteria, such as recipient governance and 
adsorptive capacity, are absent. Spain has differentiated two distributional patterns in terms of its 
geographical preferences and has carried out a balanced strategy between altruist motivations 
and foreign policy interests with its former colonies. This insufficient progressiveness of 
allocation is due mainly to the influence of the post-colonial links –although these links have 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The analysis of the geographical aid allocation started in the 1970s and combined both the 
study of the different donors’ patterns of aid giving and the aspiration to improve the 
management of the –per se scarce– resources committed to furthering the progress of the 
developing world. To date, the geographical allocation of Spanish aid has been little studied, 
despite the fact that it is unusually concentrated on middle-income countries, a fact which 
brings about an apparent “regressive bias” of aid allocation and blurs Spain’s commitment 
with the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and its special attention to the poorest 
countries. 
 
This paper analyses the Spanish official development assistance (ODA) pattern of 
geographical specialization within an “integrated” recipients’ needs and donor’s interests 
approach ( RN–DI). After this first introductory section, the second briefly reviews the 
analytical framework of the RN–DI models and summarizes the studies applied to the Spanish 
case. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework for a Spanish aid allocation policy, 
simplifying the complex Spanish policy in a three-step decision process in order to answer the 
two main questions of research: given that Spain does not co-operate with a certain number of 
developing countries, what factors determine whether a country is deemed eligible for 
assistance?, and, within the group of “aid-partner countries”, what factors determine the aid-
quotas eventually allocated? The fourth section sets out the econometric equations used for 
the estimation of an accurate RN–DI model of Spanish assistance, as well as explain the 
nature of the dependent variable (the participation in the ODA) and the explanatory variables, QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 3 
 
the model specification, the sample characteristics and the period of analysis. Section 5 offers 
the empirical results, analysing, on the one hand, the aid selection stage and, on the other, the 
aid-quotas stage, distinguishing between two groups of partner countries in terms of their 
post-colonial links with Spain. Finally, section 6 points out the main conclusions of the 
analysis and proposes policy criteria that seek to improve the impact of the geographical 
allocation of Spanish aid. 
 
2.  STUDIES OF THE GEGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION OF SPANISH AID 
 
The early studies of aid allocation tried to establish the methodological basis for the analysis 
of the variables that determine the donors’ distributive patterns, thus developing the 
theoretical framework of the initially denominated recipients’ needs versus donor’s interests 
approach (RN vs. DI analysis). McKinlay and Little (1977) defined the differences between 
these two explanatory models: 
 
The two competing views that have emerged to explain [the transfer of aid between 
independent countries] are differentiated primarily by the rationale underlying the allocation 
of aid. The humanitarian view emphasizes the economic-assistance utility, suggesting that the 
provision of aid is designed to promote economic development in low-income countries, 
while the foreign policy view emphasizes the instrumental utility of aid, suggesting that its 
provision is designed to promote the foreign policy interests of the donor (pp. 58–59). 
 
Both approaches consider the donor country’s aid budget as predetermined and therefore the 
Government deliberates on the geographical allocation regarding the different sets of 
variables. On the one hand, the recipient needs approach may be represented by means of a 
function that expresses the aid allocation in terms of a series of variables correlated with the 
developing countries’ needs, in such a way that aid is inversely related to the levels of 
development and directly related to the population sizes: 
 
RN model:   At = f (Njt);  j = 1, …, J        [ 1 ]  
 
where At is the donor’s aid budget in period t, and Nj is a vector of variables that explains the 
level of necessity of the recipient country j, which determines its aid allocation. 
 
On the other hand, the donor’s interests approach can be expressed by means of a function 
that expresses the ODA allocation in terms of a set of indicative parameters of the donor’s 
economic and geo-strategic interests. This is formally written as: 
 
DI model:   At = f (Ijt);  j = 1, …, J       [ 2 ]  
 
where Ij is a vector of variables that explains the donor’s interests in the recipient country j, 
which determines the levels of aid allocated. 
 
This way it is possible to identify which of these two models most accurately explains the 
determinants of a donor’s geographical specialization. Nevertheless, there is an alternative 
economic specification that consists of integrating in the same model both vectors of 
variables: the donor’s self-interests and the recipient countries’ needs. Moreover, a set of 
variables related to the determinant factors of aid effectiveness (such as the recipient 
countries’ good governance, institutional quality and absorptive capacity) can be added to 
this approach. This integrated –hybrid– model of aid allocation can be expressed in the 
following way: QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 4 
 
RN–DI integrated model:  At = f (Njt, Ijt, Gjt);  j = 1, …, J     [3] 
 
where Gj is a vector of variables representative of the “quality” of the recipient governments’ 
policies, institutions and absorptive capacity. 
 
Although a number of studies have analysed the geographical aid allocation patterns of the 
main bilateral and multilateral donors
2, the Spanish case has received very limited attention. 
 
Alonso (1999) carried out a cross-section analysis of the Spanish 1996 ODA allocation, 
verifying that, although the aid distribution was guided by both “aid demand and supply 
factors”, the foreign policy’s regional preferences determined, to a great extent, the allocation 
pattern. However, once this regional factor was considered, the aid disbursements were 
directly related to the recipients’ developmental needs. As a conclusion –the author claimed– 
“it is necessary to correct the historical regional preferences of the Spanish co-operation 
system if we want to put an end to the bias that, to-date, can be found in its geographical 
distribution and grant a clearer priority to the less developed countries” (pp. 135-136). 
 
Sánchez Alcázar (1999) studied the Spanish aid disbursed to Latin America between 1989 
and 1993, ascertaining that the donor’s self-interests (exports, especially) determined the aid 
allocation, whereas the recipients’ needs did not affect the distribution. These results partially 
disagree with those offered by Alonso (1999), although these two studies refer to different 
periods, and therefore the discrepancies can be explained by changes in the allocation pattern 
over time. In any event, the trade bias pointed out by Sánchez Alcázar belongs to the 
“gestation period” of the Spanish co-operation system –a period not included in the present 
paper–, when aid loans contributed to 60% of the gross bilateral ODA disbursements (in 
contrast with the 32.2% share in the two-year period 1998–99 and the 19% in 2004–05). 
 
Other studies have compared the allocation patterns of different donors, using “standard” 
models of analysis –i.e. applying the same general model to different bilateral and multilateral 
donors–, although few of them have specifically looked into the case of Spain: 
 
Berthèlemy and Tichit (2002) carried out a panel-data analysis of the aggregated ODA 
allocation of the 22 DAC donors for the period 1980–99, using the same set of explanatory 
variables for each donor country (and, therefore, “assuming that all the donors have the same 
behaviour”, p. 9), but included dummy variables in order to reflect their peculiar interests, 
such as the colonial links. In accordance with their Tobit estimates, Spain was strongly 
specialized in its former colonies –as has occurred with other former metropolises–, giving 
them, on average, during the 1990s decade, between 2.3 and 2.7 additional dollars of per 
capita aid. 
 
Alesina and Weder (2002) analyzed the aid allocation of 13 DAC donors using a Tobit panel 
data model for the period 1970–94. In the case of Spain (with the analysis restricted to the 
period 1990–94), none of the considered explanatory variables (per capita income, 
population, trade openness and political rights) were found statistically significant in the aid 
per capita allocation. However, as they used the same “standard” model for analysing 
different donors’ allocations, they did not consider the colonial past as an explanatory variable 
in the Spanish specialization, which may bias the estimates due to the omission of a relevant 
                                                 
2 McGillivray and White (1993), Tarp et al. (1998), McGillivray (2003a), Jones et al. (2005) and Tezanos (2008) 
review the economic contributions to the studies of aid allocation. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 5 
 
regressor
3. In any case, this failure to identify a systematic pattern of aid allocation responds –
to a great extent– to the high resources’ fragmentation among those countries that do not 
share post-colonial links with Spain. 
 
Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) analysed the ODA per capita allocation of 20 DAC donors during 
the period 1980–2003 using a Tobit panel data model. Regarding the Spanish case, their broad 
study concludes that –for the period 1991–2003– “the elements that influence Spain’s aid 
allocation are a mixture of the donor self-interests and recipient needs” (p. 14). This analysis 
includes different model specifications and uses several sets of explanatory variables. In 
accordance with their full-model, Spanish aid allocation has been positively related to the 
share of “social aid” (the percentage of bilateral ODA devoted to the sector of “social 
infrastructure and services”), although Isopi and Mavrotas emphasize that “the trade relations 
seem to play a leading role in foreign aid allocation” (p. 14), which –in their opinion– is due 
to the strong trade links maintained with the former colonies. The allocation also favours the 
countries with more egalitarian income distributions and higher growth rates in the previous 
year
4. They also included two additional regressors in the model: the aid “past outcomes” (i.e. 
aid effectiveness
5) and the infant mortality rate
6, which were shown to be significant and 
positively related with the per capita aid distribution. Finally, arms transfers, per capita 
income, population and the quality of democratic institutions were found irrelevant in the 
allocation, thus concluding that “political and strategic factors do not exert a relevant impact 
in the allocation process” (p. 15). However, Isopi and Mavrotas do not include any cultural 
affinity variable, although they mention the post-colonial links in order to explain most of 
their results; moreover, some of the variables used in their analysis may bias the estimations 
due to a non-random sample selection (as it happens with the inequality data), and they 
introduce assumptions that are not appropriate for the particular Spanish co-operation policies 
(among others, the assumption that the effectiveness of the World Bank’s projects is 
equivalent to that of Spain’s projects is far from clear, given the strong discrepancies that can 
be found in the geographical interests of both donors). 
 
All in all, the Spanish pattern of aid giving shows some similarities with those of the USA, 
Japan and France –which are also strongly determined by their preferences towards their 
respective geographical interests– and differs greatly from the aid allocation of the 
Scandinavian countries, UK, and Canada –which are, to a larger extent, oriented towards the 
most needed developing countries. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Alesina and Weder measured the historical links between donors and recipients by means of the number of 
years that the developing countries were colonies of the metropolises during the 20
th Century, thus excluding all 
Spanish colonies. They also used a variable of political alliances (the frequency of cases in which the receiving 
country voted in the UN in the same way as the donor) that could not be used in the case of Spain due to the lack 
of information. 
4 The Gini index used in the analysis raises serious concerns, as it is not available for the vast majority of 
developing countries, and, in those cases where the information is available, there is not complete time series 
data, but decades values. Furthermore, the Human Development Report prevents that “because the underlying 
household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, the distribution data are not strictly 
comparable across countries” (UNDP, 2006, in: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/147.html). 
5 Isopi and Mavrotas used the World Bank’s Operations and Evaluations Department calculations of the aid 
projects’ rates of return, assuming that the levels of effectiveness obtained by the analyzed bilateral donors are 
identical to those of the World Bank (inter alia effectiveness). 
6 In the context of the model proposed by Isopi and Mavrotas, reductions of the infant mortality rate can stem 
from greater levels of investment in social infrastructure, which may imply a lost of efficiency in the estimations 
due to the existence of colinearity between these two explanatory variables. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 6 
 
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF SPANISH ODA ALLOCATION 
   
This section proposes a theoretical framework for the Spanish ODA geographical allocation 
which follows the seminal contribution of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) by focusing the 
analysis on the economic behaviour of the decision-makers responsible for the aid allocation
7. 
This model adopted a microeconomic approach in which aid is considered as a good 
indirectly consumed by the donor’s citizens. The donor country expects from its aid-partners 
support for its own foreign policies and benefits in economic relations, and also the 
“satisfaction” stemmed from perceiving that its aid contributes to the  improvement of the 
standard of life of the recipients –i.e., that aid is effective–. The final allocations maximize 
each donor function, which combine both altruist and self-interest criteria. 
 
Contrary to other theoretical contributions, the model proposed in this paper puts forward a 
specific framework for a Spanish co-operation policy, understanding that more general 
approaches do not consider the peculiarities of the policy management of the donor States, 
thus offering less precise interpretations of their specialization patterns
8. The model conceives 
the Spanish ODA geographical allocation as a three-step decision process, taking into account 
the censored nature of the dependent variable –an approach that has not been previously 
applied to the study of the Spanish case
9–: in the first stage, the Spanish Government decides 
both the total amount of resources that will be devoted to international co-operation, and the 
share of multilateral and bilateral aid; in the second stage, the Government chooses the group 
of partner countries which will receive bilateral aid from the list of “eligible” developing 
countries according to the OECD DAC’s directives; finally, in the third stage, the aid-quotas 
of each partner country in the Spanish budget are determined. 
 
3.1.  First decision stage: determination of the Spanish ODA budget and the shares of 
multilateral and bilateral aid 
   
Given the particularities of the Spanish aid management policy, it is assumed that the first-
step decision is exogenous to the geographical allocation of aid: the Spanish Government 
decides annually both the total ODA budget, and the share that will be actually managed by 
the Spain’s public sector (bilateral aid) and that by international organizations (multilateral 




The Government decides on the annual aid budget within the Spain’s General Public Budget 
(Presupuestos Generales del Estado), within the “foreign policy” item
11. The Public Budget 
specifies the endowment of the several Central Government aid agents that carry out bilateral 
                                                 
7 Other theoretical models that followed Dudley and Montmarquette are: Trumbull and Wall (1994), Tarp et al. 
(1999), Feeny and McGillivray (2002) and Feeny (2003). However, based on this theoretical framework, several 
empirical applications have been carried out, using increasingly sophisticated econometric techniques, from the 
initial regression analyses with cross-section data (vid, for example, Levitt, 1968; Mckinlay and Little, 1977; 
Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; and Alonso, 1999), to the most complex panel data models with limited dependent 
variables (such as Alesina and Dollar, 1998; Tarp et al., 1999; Berthèlemy and Tichit, 2002; Alesina and Weder, 
2002; Neumayer, 2003; McGillivray, 2003b; Dollar and Levin, 2004; Canavire et al., 2005; and Isopi and 
Mavrotas, 2006). 
8 Only Tarp et al. (1999) developed a theoretical model adapted to the singular characteristics of the analysed 
donor: the Danish State. 
9 Neither Alonso (1999), nor Sánchez Alcázar (1999), considered in their studies the censored nature of aid. 
10 It should be recalled that the Spanish ODA/GNI ratio has been increasing in the last two decades, from 0.08% 
in 1986-87 to 0.27% in 2005. 
11 However, there are also extra-budgetary items, such as debt forgiveness, which is internationally coordinated. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 7 
 
policies (therefore not including local and regional governments’ aid budgets) and the 
contributions to international organizations (multilateral aid). The Budget is finally approved 
by the Parliament and, thus, the Government decides the geographical allocation of aid as far 
as it determines the endowment of the main aid instruments managed by the different aid 
decision-makers. 
 
Moreover, the Government is also responsible for elaborating the Spanish Aid Strategic Plan 
(Plan Director de Cooperación), which specifies the strategy for the next 4 years, including 
the geographical priorities. Finally, the Spanish Aid Department (SECI) elaborates the Annual 
Plan of International Co-operation (PACI), which details the aid budget and the endowments 
of the different official aid policy agents (including, in this case, the local and regional 
governments), with the purpose of advancing towards fulfilling the goals set forth in the four-
year Aid Plan. 
 
All in all, the central Government is the first “aid policy-maker”, deciding both the volume of 
resources, and its preliminary geographical distribution. Nevertheless, eventually different 
economic agents take charge of the aid administration: these are mainly the Spanish Aid 
Agency (AECI, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation), several 




The proposed model considers that the result of this first-step decision is determined ex ante. 
The Government decides every year the amount of resources set aside for co-operation for 
development in accordance with its own preferences for different public policies that compete 
for the resources endowment. However, there are two political commitments that determine 
the aid budget: on the one hand, the Monterrey’s financial commitment of achieving the 
0.33% ODA/GNI ratio by 2006, and, on the other hand, the Government’s own commitment 
of achieving the 0.5% ratio by 2008 (as foreseen by the Aid Plan), and the 0.7% by 2012 (in 
the event of being re-elected). Finally, the ODA budget ( t A
~
) is specified each year in the 
PACI, delimiting the maximum amount of resources finally distributed among international 
organizations or directly managed by the different public agents of the Spanish State. 
Formally, this trade-off can be written as follows: 
 







M B A c A A c A t A
τ τ ) ( ) (
~ )
                                                
       [ 4 ]  
 
where   is the total bilateral ODA allocable among J possible developing countries and 












12 Hence –according to direct sources of the Aid Department–, the Government is conscious of the fact that the 
budget allocated to the AECI (given the aid instruments that it administrates, mostly grants and micro-loans) is 
more oriented towards lower income countries. On the contrary, the resources allocated to the concessional loan 
scheme (the so-called FAD loans) are mainly oriented to middle income countries (mainly, East Asia, given the 
high participation of China and Latin America in the scheme). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 8 
 
The previous constraint includes positive aid administrative costs, since not all the aid budget 
is geographically allocable; i.e. the administrative costs reduce the quantity of resources 
finally disbursed to developing countries
13. A similar reasoning can be applied to the 
administrative costs of multilateral institutions. Thus cB is a constant which represents the 
incidence of these costs on bilateral aid and cM is the incidence on multilateral aid. Finally, the 




Equation [4] formulates the Spanish State’s trade-off between bilateral and multilateral aid. In 
particular, during the period 2000–05, Spain distributed, on average, almost 40% of its 
resources via multilateral organizations (well above the average of most donor countries). The 
multilateral/bilateral trade-off implies different advantages and disadvantages for the Spanish 
State: 
 
i)  Bilateral aid accords greater international, bilateral, influence for Spain, since aid 
can be used as a means to further the donor’s foreign policy interests. Also, the State 
obtains greater “political returns”, as bilateral aid is more visible for its own citizens (a 
fact which is especially outstanding in the cases of local and regional governments –
which are the closest Public Administrations to the citizenship– and the financing of 
NGOs). 
 ii)  On the other hand, greater financial contributions to international organizations 
mean greater Spanish influence and presence in the multilateral scenario. 
iv)  Different levels of aid effectiveness between bilateral and multilateral policies 
would determine the allotment of the Spanish resources. Furthermore, it makes sense to 
think that the Spanish State is willing to alleviate its own constraints to efficiently 
manage the ever-increasing aid resources by delegating part of the management to 
international organizations. 
v)  MILNER (2005) claims that multilateral aid can contribute to solve a “principal-
agent problem” for donor countries
15. Her study of the aggregated behaviour of 27 
bilateral donors suggests that countries with more citizens sceptical about the value of 
aid tend to delegate a greater proportion of their resources to international organizations. 
vi)  In accordance with the existing aid allocation literature, the variables governing 
multilateral allocation have been systematically different from those determining 
bilateral donors’ allocations, specially, due to the supranational interests promoted by 
international organisms –vid, for example, Trumbull and Wall (1994), Neumayer 
(2003), Burnside and Dollar (2004), Canavire et al. (2005) and Levin and Dollar (2005). 
  
In fact, the Spanish geographical priorities do not always match the multilateral interests. 
During the period 2000–05 the discrepancies were remarkable: in the case of the aggregated 
multilateral aid, the main recipient regions were Africa (especially the Sub-Saharan region) 
and Asia (especially South and Central Asia), which shared 43% and 34% of the total net 
disbursements, respectively (Table 1). On the other hand, Spanish bilateral ODA went mainly 
                                                 
13  There are also aid resources committed to finance horizontal co-operation strategies that cannot be 
geographically allocated to specific recipient countries. 
14 The parameters τB and τM can have different values. For example, if 0 < τ < 1, it implies decreasing marginal 
returns to the aid administrative costs; if τ = 1, there are constant returns; and if τ > 1, there are increasing 
marginal returns. 
15 In the case of aid, the principal-agent problem is further exacerbated since “aid goes to recipients in foreign 
countries who cannot vote in the donor country, and taxpayers in donor countries have little knowledge of how 
their tax dollars are spent in these foreign countries” (MILNER, p. 32) QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 9 
 
to Latin America (totalling 45%, almost 6 times more than multilateral aid), followed, at great 
distance, by Africa (21%, i.e. less than half of the multilateral allocation), being specially 
lower the participation of the Sub-Saharan region
16. 
 
Table 1. Geographical distribution of aggregated multilateral ODA and Spanish bilateral 
ODA (percentages) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 
2000-05
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average 
2000-05
Africa 37,3 38,7 43,6 42,4 46,4 47 42,6 14,9 12,5 23,2 18,3 20,9 34,6 20,7
North Sahara 3,2 3,5 2,1 2,7 3,7 3,7 3,2 2,2 4,8 6,8 4,6 8 4,3 5,1
South Sahara 33,4 34,8 40,9 39,3 42,4 43 39 12,7 7,6 16,3 13,7 12,9 30,1 15,5
America 7,2 8,8 6,4 8,2 7,5 7,7 7,6 44,4 60,3 41,4 44,9 45,1 31,4 44,6
North and Central 4,7 4,6 4,0 4,1 4,9 3,9 4,4 21,4 46,2 20,7 19,3 26,6 14,9 24,8
South 2,2 3,8 1,9 3,3 2,1 3 2,7 15,7 11,0 17,9 20,7 15,1 13,3 15,6
Asia 34,7 34,4 34,7 34,8 31,2 30,9 33,5 18,7 11,5 12,4 12,9 13,1 19,5 14,7
Far East 11,4 9,9 8,1 9,5 6,7 6,5 8,7 15,2 6,4 5,2 5,6 3,6 4,5 6,7
South and Central 17,5 18,5 20,7 18,4 17,9 17,7 18,5 0,2 1,9 4,3 1,0 2,4 2,2 2
Middle East 5,5 5,5 5,4 6,4 6,1 5,7 5,8 2,9 3,1 2,6 6,3 6,9 12,8 5,8
Europe 12,0 9,8 8,5 6,7 7,5 6,7 8,5 9,7 5,2 10,7 10,1 7,0 2,7 7,5
Oceania 0,8 0,5 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,8 0,5 … … … … … … …
Unspecified regions 7,9 7,9 6,5 7,6 6,8 6,9 7,3 12,4 10,4 12,3 13,8 13,9 11,9 12,5
Total Developing Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Aggregated Multilateral ODA Spanish bilateral ODA
 
Percentages of ODA net disbursements 
Source: OECD: DAC (2007). Developed by author 
 
Hence, there is no clear association between the patterns of geographical aid distribution of 
the aggregated multilateral organizations and the Spanish State. Graph 1 depicts, in a 
tentative way, the level of association of both allocations in the period 2000–05, which 
appears to be statistically non-significant (R
2 = 0,015) and with no clear trend. Spain’s partner 
countries concentrate on the left-half of the two-way scatter chart –i.e. among the countries 
with smaller receptions of multilateral aid–. There are some outstanding outliers: Nicaragua 
(with a Spanish disbursement of more than 130 million dollars, in comparison with the, 
relatively, much lower multilateral assistance) and Mexico (with a negative net Spanish 
disbursement, and a positive multilateral one). On the other hand, the main recipient countries 
of multilateral ODA (Pakistan and India) drew less attention from Spain –furthermore, the 












                                                 
16 Sub-Saharan Africa historically has not been a high-priority region for Spain. However, it has attracted a 
greater attention from Spanish foreign policy in the last years, especially due to the increase in immigration, 
which has resulted in larger aid-quotas. In particular, the 2005 figure is partially driven by the debt cancellations 
of the Congo Republic, Madagascar, Senegal and Ghana, which amounted to more than two thirds of the aid 
disbursed to this region. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 10 
 
Graph 1. Two-way scatter plot of aggregated multilateral ODA and Spanish bilateral ODA 
geographical allocations. 2000–05 
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ODA net disbursements. Average 2000–05. Current USA dollars 
The regression analysis includes only Spain’s aid recipient countries 
Source: OECD: DAC (2007) 
 
Moreover, it should be born in mind that, to a large extent, financial contributions to 
international organizations are compulsory for their members, and have previously 
determined quotas and time schedules (usually, biannual), that cannot be easily affected by 
individual bilateral donors
17. All in all, it is assumed that the decision on how much aid to 
allocate to multilateral organizations (as a share of the Spanish total aid budget) is 
“predetermined”, and, therefore, its effect on Spain’s geographical allocation is exogenous, 
given the limited influence that bilateral donors exert on the orientation of multilateral aid
18. 
Thus, the first summing-up expression of equation [4] yields the aid budget –exogenous and 
politically predetermined–. Once subtracted the administrative costs, the geographically 
allocable ODA (ABt) constitutes the dependent variable of this analysis
19: 
 
                                                 
17  However, donor countries can make voluntary subscriptions to multilateral institutions. They can also 
voluntarily contribute to funds and programmes, which are recorded by the DAC as “multi-bilateral aid” –
therefore, as the recipient countries are identifiable, these resources are included in the present analysis. 
18 Nevertheless, it is possible that Spain conceives the pattern of multilateral ODA allocation as complementary 
to its own geographical preferences. This way, the large share of Spanish assistance received by Latin America 
would  compensate for the lower attention received by this region on the part of the multilateral co-operation. 
19 Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the DAC as grants and loans to developing countries 
which are: 
(a) undertaken by the official sector; 
(b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; 
(c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a Grant Element of at least 25 per cent). In 
addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for 
military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations 
or insurance payouts) are in general not counted (OECD: DAC, June 2007, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 11 
 
( ∑ − =
J
j
jt B jt Bt
B A c A A
τ ) ( )           [ 5 ]  
 
3.2.  Second decision stage: selection of aid-partner countries 
 
Secondly, the model assumes that the Spanish State selects the group of aid-partner countries 
each year. The selection stage can be analysed according to the following attraction index
20: 
 
γ ϕ δ β α
jt jt jt jt jt H G I N e
j ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Λ  
0 ≤ αj ≤ 1;  0 ≤ β ≤ 1;  0 ≤ δ ≤ 1;  0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1;  0 ≤ θ ≤  1    [6] 
 
where Λjt measures the interest of the donor for a developing country j. N, I, G and H are 
vectors of explanatory variables regarding the recipient countries’ needs, the donor’s interests, 
the aid effectiveness determining factors and the allocation’s path dependence (history), 
respectively. β, δ, φ, and θ are sets of weights; all of them are constrained within the interval 
[0, 1] so as to reflect the possible existence of decreasing marginal returns
21. The parameter αj 
measures the fixed effects associated with each recipient country that are not determined by 
the variables N, I, G and H. 
 
Once the donor estimates the attraction indexes for each partner country, the following 
selection rule is applied: 
 
Djt = 1   if 
  ϑ
t B jt A k ⋅ ≥ Λ
Djt = 0   if   
ϑ
t B jt A k ⋅ < Λ
 
Pr(Djt = 1) = Pr( ) = Pr( ); –∞ < ϑ   <  ∞    [7] 
ϑ
t B jt A k ⋅ ≥ Λ 0 ≥ ⋅ − Λ
ϑ
t B jt A k
 
where Djt = 1 indicates that country j is chosen as a partner, ABt is the predetermined amount 
of bilateral ODA geographically allocable among J possible developing countries, and k is a 
constant. Recipient countries are ranked following their respective scores on the attraction 
indexes, which determine their selection probabilities, so that those above the selection 
threshold k⋅ ABt
ϑ  are finally chosen as aid-partners. 
 
The parameter ϑ reflects the donor’s aversion/predisposition to disperse its aid budget among 
the  J eligible countries: if ϑ  > 0, there is aversion to dispersion (as ϑ tends to ∞, the 
dispersion of the resources is penalized and the selection probability decreases); on the other 
hand, if ϑ < 0, there is predisposition to dispersion (as ϑ tends to –∞, both the dispersion of 
the resources and the probability of being chosen as an aid-partner increases). Also, if ϑ = 0, 
the selection rule does not depend on the volume of aid. This parameter of aversion to 
dispersion is especially outstanding in the context of a donor, as Spain, that is experiencing a 
gradual increase of its resources: as the volume of ODA increases, so does the financial 
capacity to disburse aid to a greater number of countries and –therefore– the probability of 
being selected as a partner. Nevertheless, if ϑ > 0, the donor's aversion to dispersion will 
compensate the previous effect. 
                                                 
20 The use of a “selection threshold” follows the approach of TARP et al. (1999). 
21 The existence of decreasing marginal returns guarantees that the donor will not concentrate all its resources in 
one recipient: the one with the highest score in the attraction index. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 12 
 
∞ → ϑ
Lim  Pr(Djt = 1) = Pr( ∞ ≥ Λ jt ) → 0 
−∞ → ϑ
Lim Pr(Djt = 1) = Pr( 0 ≥ Λ jt )  →  1          [ 8 ]  
 
The result of choosing the country j as a partner is thus interpreted as the difference in the 
utility obtained by Spain between giving and not giving aid to this country, being positive in 
the event of selection and zero or negative otherwise. 
Substituting [6] into [7] and using logarithms yields the following linear probability function: 
 
Pr(Djt = 1) =  ( ) 0 ln ln ln ln ln ln Pr ≥ − − + + + + Bt jt jt jt jt j A k H G I N ϑ θ ϕ δ β α  
  
j = 1, 2, ..., J 
t = 1, …, T               [ 9 ]  
 







































      [10] 
 
i.e. the probability of being selected as a partner for Spanish assistance depends on, 
simultaneous and positively, the developing country’s relative level of aid need, the interest it 
has for Spanish foreign policy and the factors determining aid effectiveness. Moreover, the 
allocation’s path dependence directly affects probability of being “re-selected”. 
 
3.3.  Third decision stage: allocation of aid-quotas 
 
Once a subset of K-partner countries has been selected (being K ≤ J), the Spanish State passes 








a             [ 1 1 ]  
 
where ajt measures the share of country j in Spain’s aid and ABt is the total amount of bilateral 







The Spanish objective function for geographical aid allocation is then defined as follows: 
 
Φa = f(a, N, I, G, H)            [ 1 2 ]  
 
where the variables are interpreted as in previous equations. Specifically, the objective 
function can be written as: 
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Φa =   () ∑
=
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
K
j
jt jt jt jt jt H G I N a
j
1
θ ϕ δ β α
0 ≤ αj ≤ 1;    0 ≤ β ≤ 1;    0 ≤ δ ≤ 1;    0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1;    0 ≤ θ  ≤ 1                           [13] 
 
where the parameters αj, β, δ, φ and θ are constrained within the interval [0, 1] so as to 
indicate the possible existence of decreasing marginal returns. 
 
The aim of the Spanish co-operation policy is to maximize the total utility derived from the 
aid allocations to K-partner countries, subject to the budget constraint (assuming that the aid 
budget is totally disbursed): 
 







This restriction implies that a marginal increase in the aid-quota assigned to a specific partner 
country will decreases the share of, at least, another country. 
   
The lagrangian resulting of maximizing [13] subject to [14] is: 
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The first order conditions are: 
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Taking logarithms in equation [18] yields the linear function: 
 
jt jt jt jt j jt H G I N a ln ln ln ln ln
* * * * * θ ϕ δ β α + + + + =        
j = 1, 2, ..., K 
t = 1, …, T               [ 1 9 ]  
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Therefore, equations [9] and [19] specified a RN–DI  hybrid model, and its specification 
allows us to consider a different set of explanatory variables in each decision-step
23. 
 
Finally –as Tarp et al. (1999) pointed out–, there is a potential econometric risk of 
simultaneity in the determination of the total aid budget ( t A
~
, see equation [4]) and the share 
of aid finally allocated to each partner (a,jt, see equation [18]). This problem would be serious 
if, either the total aid budget or the distribution among bilateral and multilateral aid, were to 
depend also on the same RN–DI function. However, the assumption that the first-step decision 
(see equation [4]) is exogenous with regard to the selection stage (equation [9]) and the share 
stage (equation [18]) minimizes the simultaneity bias. 
 
3.4.  Determinant factors for Spanish aid allocation 
 
As equations [6] and [12] establish, Spain’s aid allocation decision depends on several 
variables that, for reasons of simplicity, may be grouped into four explanatory factors: 
recipient countries’ needs, donor’s foreign policy interests, aid effectiveness determining 
factors and the allocation’s path dependence: 
 
i)  Regarding the recipient countries’ relative needs, aid should be concentrated in the 
poorest countries, as it is explicitly pointed out by the OECD, which attributes to the ODA 
“the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective” (OECD: DAC, op cit.). In the particular case of Spain, the Aid Law establishes that 
the main objective of aid is to contribute to the “eradication of the World poverty, in all its 
manifestations” (1
st article), and understands that the human being is the main protagonist of 
the co-operation policies. Especially clear is the aspiration to allocate the resources in 
accordance with the basic criterion established in the article 5: “[...] less economically and 
socially developed countries will receive special attention from the Spanish co-operation”. 
 
Moreover, Spain should take into account the relative level of need of each partner country in 
terms of their share in the global ODA (i.e. total aid disbursed by multilateral and bilateral 
donors). On this matter, there are two possible scenarios: 
 
–  A negative relation between the Spanish allocation and the rest of the donors’ 
allocations shall reflect certain coordination among donors’ interventions, avoiding infra 
and supra-allocations in specific regions. In this scenario, it is reasonable to consider 
                                                 
22 We could also define cross-elasticities so as to reflect the fact that the allocation to a particular partner country 
does not depend only on its RN–DI scores, but also on the scores of the K–1 remaining recipients. For reasons of 
simplicity, the model only considers the direct elasticities indicated in equation [19]. 
23 i.e. there is not an a priori reason for the parameters of these two equations to be the same. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 15 
 
that the Spanish middle-income country bias is due to a specialization pattern with Latin 
America, agreed within an international coordination scheme. 
–  On the contrary, a positive relation shall reflect the existence of the so-called 
“bandwagon effect”. As Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) first explained, this 
behaviour implies that the donor’s perception of the impact of its aid on a specific 
developing country is positively influenced by the volume of aid that this country 
attracts from the rest of donors. 
 
ii)  With regard to foreign policy interests, traditionally Spain has oriented its aid towards 
Latin America, Equatorial Guinea, the Philippines and Morocco, due to the historical links. 
Specifically, the Spanish Aid Law clearly establishes that the geographical priorities are “[...] 
Latin American countries, the Arab countries of North Africa and Middle East, as well as 
other less developed countries that maintain special historical and cultural links with Spain” 
(6
th article). These historical links are determined by a series of cultural affinities, such as 
language, religion and legislative tradition, factors that Spain has considered facilitate more 
effective co-operation relations. Supporting this argument, the DAC’s review on Spanish aid 
(2002) pointed out the existence of a “comparative advantage” with Latin America, based on 
strong linguistic, cultural and historical ties. 
 
Furthermore, Spain may be stimulating its trade and investment interests through the 
allocation of aid to its main economic partners. In fact, this was the original aim of the FAD 
loans scheme, which was set up in 1976 in order to foster the exports of the Spanish 
enterprises. 
 
iii) Regarding  the  determinant factors of aid effectiveness, the international community 
has increasingly reached a consensus on the significance of the recipient countries’ economic, 
social, political and institutional environment in the development process and the 
effectiveness of aid
24. Good governance has been one of the main DAC’s concerns since 
1989, which points out the existence of a “vital connection between open, democratic and 
accountable political systems, individual rights and the effective and equitable operation of 
economic systems”
25. 
Thus, Spanish aid should promote good public policies of the recipient governments, as is 
expressly ratified both in the Aid Law and the current Aid Plan: the latter claims that one of 
the aid’s main goals is “[…] the promotion of democracy and the respect of the fundamental 
rights, from a real and effective citizen participation, and the exercise and respect of human 
rights, as they are recognized within the United Nations framework” (MAE, 2005, p. 37). 
Moreover, the Plan claims that the geographical specialization should be guided by the 
“greater commitment of recipient countries to the development goals, and, in particular, the 
adoption of appropriate policies to fulfil the goals of the Millennium Declaration and other 
international agreements signed by the country” (p. 99). With this in mind, in 2006, Spain 
elaborated a “Strategy for the promotion of democratic governance, citizen participation and 
institutional development”. 
 
In the end, it is assumed that aid is more effective in those countries with sound political and 
institutional environments. This assumption is the heir of the pioneer studies on aid 
effectiveness carried out by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000 and 2004) –promoted by the 
                                                 
24 Good reviews on aid effectiveness literature can be found in Alonso (2003) and McGillivray (2003c). 
25 Policy statement by DAC aid ministers and heads of aid agencies on development co-operation in the 1990s, 
reprinted in the 1989 DAC Development Co-operation Report, OECD (1989). Available in: 
http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649_34435_2755285_119814_1_1_1,00.html QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 16 
 
World Bank’s Development Research Group– which claimed that the impact of aid on growth 
depends both on the recipient countries’ policies and institutions, and on the management by 
the donor. Although these results have been highly controversial, Collier and Dollar (2001 
and 2002) developed the so-called “anti-poverty efficient allocations”, which were published 
in the World Bank’s report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998), arguing that a re-allocation 
towards poor countries with sound policies could free from poverty a greater number of 
people than the current resource allocation
26. 
 
Furthermore, the recipient economy’s absorptive capacity is included in the model so as to 
take into account the productive constraints of additional aid allocations and the existence of 
decreasing marginal returns on aid
27. 
 
iii)  With regard to the aid’s path dependence, the proposed model measures the “inertial 
effect” exerted by previous allocations, which has several explanations: 
 
a)  Donors tend to co-operate with a steady group of partner countries so as to 
minimize the aid administrative costs; i.e. adding new partners means incurring in 
additional expenses due to the necessity of implementing new bilateral mechanisms in 
order to assure that aid is effective. Moreover, the donor’s aid management may be 
benefited by “learning economies”, based on previous experiences of assisting the same 
group of countries, which lead to increased administrative efficiency levels. Spain’s 
current effort of acquiring greater administrative capacity in the so-called “priority 
countries” determines, to some extent, these countries future probabilities of being aid 
recipients –and, in the end, their permanence in the list of priorities
28. 
b)  Closely related to the previous argument, the donor is responsible for providing 
their partners with a stable assistance so as to generate long-term sustainable 
development processes –provided that the terms of co-operation are fulfilled–. This is 
the case of Spanish aid which is reinforced by the current increasing emphasis on 
programme aid, instead of short-term projects. A greater stability in the relations with 
partner countries is also caused by the use of new aid instruments (such as global funds, 
budget support and sector wide approaches), which have longer term perspectives, grant 
a greater role to the recipient and require greater coordination among donors. 
c)  The inertia is led by previous experiences where aid was shown to be 
particularly effective. Thus it may include the factor of “previous results” identified by 
Isopi and Mavrotas (2006), but without the controversial assumption of inter alia 
effectiveness
29. 
d)  Spain’s co-operation with Latin America has been especially stable over time. 
The Aid Plan gives a set of institutional and geo-strategic reasons, which constitute an 
inertial movement in the assistance and why “Latin America has been, and will be, a 
priority region for Spanish aid” (MAE, 2005, p. 104). Moreover, Spanish NGOs’ 
assistance to Latin America also has a structural character, and the inertia of this co-
operation is partially due to the reduced size of these organizations (which determines 
                                                 
26 McKinlay and Little (1977) were the first authors to test the role of “political stability” and “democracy” in the 
aid allocation. 
27 Vid, among others, the studies of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), Lensink and White (2001) and Hansen 
and Tarp (2000). 
28 Most of these countries already have in situ technical co-operation offices and country strategic plans. 
29  In this respect, the current Aid Plan is committed to make progress in aid planning and management 
procedures, based on previous results, in order to increase the effectiveness levels. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 17 
 
their specialization in this region) and the cultural and linguistic affinities with the 
Latino countries. 
e)  Long-running political commitments between donor and recipient have an 
outstanding importance in the allocation process and contributes to an additional factor 
of stability, as it is specially complicated to retract resources from a long-running aid-
partner.  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL MODEL OF SPANISH ODA GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION 
 
4.1.  Econometric specification of the model 
 
The estimation of the theoretical model explained in the preceding section requires tackling 
the censored nature of ODA allocations. From a statistical point of view, when the explained 
variable’s data is only available for some limited observations, the analysis deals with a so-
called  censored sample: the exclusion of some developing countries from the Spanish 
assistance implies that aid is partially continuous with positive probability mass at the value 
of zero. This characteristic of the aid flows is represented by the selection of a threshold –
which is a latent variable– where the donor starts to disburse positive amounts of aid (vid the 
attraction index defined in equation [6])
30. 
 
If the observations for ajt = 0 (vid equation [11]) were excluded from the sample, the 
estimation will violate one of the assumptions of the linear regression model: given the set of 
explanatory variables, the expected value of the errors is equal to zero (E[uj] = 0). Therefore, 
the estimates will be biased and inconsistent, as would be the case of an ordinary least square 
estimation (although it has been frequently used in the aid allocation literature). By contrast, 
limited dependent variable regression models do not omit these null observations, allowing 
the “latent” decision of excluding those countries that lie under the threshold level to be 
analysed. 
 
Three alternative econometric models have been previously used in the aid allocation 
analysis
31: the TOBIT model; the type 2 TOBIT model (HECKMAN or sample selection 
model); and the two-part model: 
 
– The TOBIT model strictly describes a one-step decision process, where the donor only 
considers the final aid disbursements without first determining the list of aid-partner 
countries. Thus it partially answers the two research questions previously raised in this 
paper since the variables determining the partners’ selection process and the allocation 
of the aid-quotas must be the same and exert the same degree of influence. As was 
explained in the previous section, this procedure does not intuitively fit the Spanish aid 
allocation policy. 
– The type 2 TOBIT model estimates two –correlated– allocation stages, but the 
efficiency of the estimation depends upon the inclusion of an “exclusion restriction” that 
determines the aid eligibility, but not the aid-quotas eventually allocated. However, it 
has not been an easy task for the aid allocation studies to find such a restriction. 
                                                 
30 A latent variable is a critical value determined by a set of explanatory variables in such a way that if a 
developing country surpasses this threshold, it will receive a positive aid disbursement. Thus the threshold level 
can be determined by RN and DI variables, as it was explicitly established in the attraction indexed defined in 
equation [6]. 
31 NEUMAYER (2003) offers a good review of the econometrics of these models within the context of the aid 
allocation analysis. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 18 
 
– By contrast, the two-part model estimates two –independent– allocation stages, 
rendering the estimation less vulnerable to the omission of explanatory variables and the 
estimates more efficient in the absence of an exclusion restriction than the type 2 
TOBIT ones. However, as the two-part model considers that both decision-steps are 
independent (i.e. the error terms of both estimations are not correlated), if they were 
actually correlated, the type 2 TOBIT estimates would be more accurate. 
 
For these reasons, given the difficulty of finding a measurable exclusion restriction for the 
Spanish aid allocation process, the present analysis uses a two-part model. Besides, as 
Manning et al. (1987) demonstrated by means of Monte Carlo experiments, any potential bias 
of the model is likely to be small in typical situations
32.  
 
The  aid selection stage defined in equation [9] is therefore estimated by means of the 
following regression function with a binary dependent variable and a panel data set
33: 
 
Pr(Djt = 1) =       [ 2 1 ]   jt jt jt jt jt j u H G I N + + + + + ln ln ln ln θ ϕ δ β α
 
where αj, β, δ, φ and θ are the parameters to estimate. 
 
The aid share stage defined in equation [19] is estimated separately for the group of partner 
countries that has post-colonial links with Spain and those countries without these historical 
ties. This procedure avoids the constraint of the fixed-effect model regarding the estimation of 
explanatory variables which do not vary over time. The panel data regression function used in 
both cases is written as
34: 
 
jt jt jt jt jt jt u H G I N D a
j jt + + + + + + = = ln ln ln ln ) 1 (
' ' ' ' ' ' * θ ϕ δ β α α     [22] 
ajt = ajt
*
  → if    Djt = 1 
ajt = 0    → 0    otherwise 
 
where the variables are defined as in previous equations and ai,j
* represents the potential aid 
endowments. 
 
4.2.  Measurement of the dependent variable: Spanish bilateral ODA 
 
This paper only analyses the bilateral resources classified by the DAC as official 
development assistance (ODA). The amount of aid can be measured in accordance with 
the donor’s commitments or the final (net or gross) disbursements. A commitment is 
defined as a “firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the 
appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified 
amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the 
benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency” (OECD: DAC, 2007, op. cit). 
WHITE and McGILLIVRAY (1995) pointed out that aid administrators decide on 
                                                 
32 Moreover, the statistical software used in this analysis, STATA 9.2, does not have a direct routine for running 
type 2 TOBIT regressions with panel data, which in practice determines the choice of the two-part procedure. 
33 Specifically, equation [21] is estimated by means of a logit regression model. As there is not an easy routine 
implemented in STATA 9.2 for logit (unconditional) fixed-effect estimation, it uses a random-effects model. 
34 In accordance with the results of the Hausman specification tests, the allocation equation for the ex-colonial 
countries is estimated by means of a fixed-effects panel data model and the equation for countries without 
historical links uses a random-effects model (results available upon request). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 19 
 
commitments, since the amount of aid eventually disbursed is not totally under their 
control (as it depends on the recipient country acceptance of the aid conditions and the 
eventual fulfilment of the agreement). Nevertheless, donor countries are not obliged to 
report the DAC on aid commitments –despite the advantages that doing so implies for 




Moreover, while aid commitments and gross disbursements are strictly positive, net 
disbursements can be negative due to the paying-off of previous “concessional  loans” 
computed as ODA. The differences between gross and net aid disbursements are relatively 
small for most donor countries, due to the high share of grants. However, Spain’s gross 
disbursements have been historically much greater than its net disbursements, and the 
proportional difference between both amounts has been well above the average of the UE and 
DAC donors. Given the historical importance of loans within the Spanish assistance (the so-
called loans of the Development Assistance Found: FAD), gross disbursements may be a 
biased measure of the real transfer of resources to developing countries. Nevertheless, the 
FAD loans are managed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade with a high degree of 
independence with respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter does not directly 
consider in its geographical orientations the loans pay-off schedule so as to compensate the 
negative disbursements (SECI’s official communication)
36. Thus, in order to analyse the most 
realistic image of the aid transfers and the Spanish aid management policy, the present 
proposed model uses ODA gross disbursements as the dependent variable of the model
37. 
 
Emergency aid is subtracted from the ODA gross disbursements because this kind of aid 
responds to “an urgent situation created by an abnormal event which a government cannot 
meet out of its own resources and which results in human suffering and/or loss of crops or 
livestock” (OECD: DAC, March 2007, op. cit). Therefore, we can assume that emergency aid 
is disbursed to countries under emergency situations in an “additive” way –i.e. additional to 
the resources that were already allocated to them–, being its geographical distribution 
independent of the previously resolved one. 
 
With regard to the debt relief actions, these are multilateral programs in which the Spanish 
State is taking part (mainly, the HIPC Initiative and the negotiations of the Paris Club), that 
impose a specific calendar and map of execution, where individual donors cannot exert a 
direct influence on the geographical orientations. However, debt forgiveness cannot be 
considered as strictly exogenous from each bilateral donor’s process of allocating aid, as 
donors could bring forward the amount of resources previously assigned to the countries 
favoured by debt cancellations. In fact, multilateral debt programmes specify detailed time 
schedules for the relief flows, which are often negotiated in international forums before 
bilateral donors decide the geographical allocation of their own resources. Despite this fact, 
the Spanish geographical allocation has occasionally been affected by major debt actions
38, 
                                                 
35 However, in accordance with official sources of the SECI, Spain will report on aid commitments from 2007 
onwards. 
36 This fact explains the incoherencies between the Spanish geographical priorities defined in the Aid Plan and 
the aid eventually disbursed: e.g. there is a number of “preferential countries” that have received negative net 
disbursements, such as Mexico in the last 7 years. 
37 Other aid magnitudes –alternative to the data provided by the DAC– are the so-called “effective development 
aid” measured by Chang, Fernandez-Arias and Serven (1998) for the period 1975–95, and the “aid quality-
adjusted” measured by Roodman (2006). 
38 Especially outstanding were the debt relief of Guatemala, in 2001, and Iraq, Madagascar and the Republic of 
Congo, in 2005, which turned these countries into the main recipients of Spanish ODA. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 20 
 
partially because debt relief programmes are managed by the Ministry of the Exchequer 
irrespectively of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation. The interviews carried out 
with aid managers of the SECI confirm that this highly independent management implies a 
lack of coordination between both Ministries, which consequently impedes anticipating the 
eventual aid allocation to those countries benefited by debt relief. Thus, the present analysis 
detracts debt actions from the ODA gross disbursement and considers that the resulting 
amount is a better approximation of the resources finally allocated by the aid decision-makers. 
 
Once the Spanish ODA gross disbursements are obtained –netted of emergency aid and debt 
cancellations–, the dependent variable of the aid-partners selection stage is computed by 
means of a dummy variable that classifies the group of developing countries into two possible 
categories: “D = 1: selected partner country” and “D = 0: otherwise”. The classification rule is 
the existence of a “significant” disbursement of aid. As McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) 
pointed out, it is convenient to use a “minimum threshold” of aid receptions so as to 
compensate the limited impact of highly scattered aid allocations that renders a certain 
number of recipients with particularly low shares –as is generally the case among the largest 
donors, although it is also typical of Spain–. While choosing a specific threshold level can be, 
ultimately, an arbitrary procedure, it is especially convenient in the case of the Spanish ODA, 
given the high level of geographical dispersion. Therefore, the first-step estimation defines a 
partner country only if it receives, at least, a 1% share of Spain’s ODA. Otherwise, the logit 
regression would be seriously unbalanced, with a greater share of category 1 (i.e. the number 
of selected countries are greatly superior to the number of non-selected ones), over-estimating 
the probabilities of being selected
39. Besides, given the censored nature of aid allocations, 
regression models with limited dependent variables require explained variables greater or 
equal to zero, which excludes negative aid disbursements. 
 
The dependent variable of the aid share stage is measured as each partner country’s quota in 
the predetermined annual amount of Spanish aid (see equation [11]). This definition in 
percentage terms has two relevant virtues. On one hand, it eliminates the bias introduced by 
the comparison of figures coming from different years, being possible to use gross 
disbursements data in current dollars; and it also eliminates the measurement error due to the 
fluctuations of the euro/dollar exchange rate. On the other hand, it avoids the bias due to the 
fact that the Spanish aid budget is increasing over time. Ultimately, since the aid figures 
reported by the DAC are measured in current dollars, we assume for simplicity that the 
euro/dollar real exchange rate remains constant among the recipient countries, not considering 
the discrepancies in the aid “real purchasing power”. 
 
4.3.  Measurement of the explanatory variables  
 
The selection of the corresponding proxy variables for the determinant factors of the Spanish 
aid allocation explained in section 3.4 follows three different criteria: firstly, it includes those 
variables that best capture the peculiarities and interests of the Spanish ODA policy. 
Secondly, it is guided by the literature review of precedent studies on geographical aid 
allocation. Finally, –from a more practical perspective– it tries to both maximize the data 
available for developing countries (avoiding in this way a sample selection bias due to a non-
random omission of data), and to avoid informative redundancy (that may cause 
multicolinearity problems). The variables included in the analysis are listed in Table 2. 
                                                 
39 Different threshold values change the probability of being selected as an aid-partner. However, they do not 
considerably affect the magnitudes and signs of the estimated parameters. Therefore, the model remains 
consistent. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 21 
 
4.3.1– Recipients’ needs 
 
The present model proxies the recipient countries’ relative needs of aid by means of the 
following variables: 
 
The per capita GDP (USA constant dollars 2000, PPP) is used as an indicator of the average 
economic welfare of the recipient societies. It tests the existence of a “progressive 
distributional criterion” in relation to the partner countries’ income levels, assessing the 
coefficient of the income’s natural logarithm
40. 
 
Recipient countries’ population sizes are included so as to test the sensitivity towards the most 
populated countries. Given the special interest of Spain in its former colonies (the majority of 
which were, except Mexico and Philippines, countries of less than 45 million inhabitants in 
2005), it tests the existence of a small countries bias (i.e. whether the population coefficient is 
smaller than 1). 
 
Table 2. Variables and sources of the RN–DI model 
 





of lags  Main source 
Dummy: Spanish  aid-
partner  D  SE  dependent 
variable   … OECD:  DAC  (2007) 
Share on Spanish  ODA 
gross disbursements  A  QE  dependent 
variable  … OECD:  DAC  (2007) 
GDP per capita PPP  GDPpc  SE, QE  RN  2  WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Population  POP  SE, QE  RN  2  WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Death rate  DR  SE, QE  RN  2  WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Share on global ODA 
(excluding Spanish aid)  a_others  SE, QE  RN  …  OECD: DAC (2007) 
Colonial dummy   d_COL  SE, QE  DI  …  CIA (2007) 
Share on Spanish exports  EXP  SE, QE  DI  1  UN ComTrade DataBase 
(2007) 
Cumulative net stock of 
Spanish foreign investment  FDI  SE, QE  DI  1 
Ministerio de Industria, 
Turismo y Comercio 
(2007) 
POLITY2  P2  SE, QE  AE  1  Polity IV Project (2005) 
Absorptive capacity 
(ODA/GDP)  AC  SE, QE  AE  2  WORLD BANK  (2006) 
Share on Spanish  ODAt-1 
gross disbursements  a _t_1  SE  H  1  OECD: DAC (2007) 
Notes: SE: selection stage; QE: aid-quotas stage; RN: recipients’ needs; DI: donor’s interests; AE: aid 
effectiveness determinants; H: aid’s path dependence  
 
Moreover, as per capita income levels only offer average information on economic wellbeing, 
other aspects of social wellbeing are approximated by means of the death rate. This variable is 
both less correlated with per capita income than other synthetic indicators (such as the 
Physical Quality of Life Index and the Human Development Index), therefore reducing the risk 
                                                 
40 As the model is specified in natural logarithms (both the dependent variable and the independent variables), it 
thus facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients in terms of elasticities. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 22 
 
of multicolinearity, and is widely available among developing countries, thus reducing the 
risk of a no-random sample selection bias
41. 
 
The share of each recipient country on the global ODA (i.e. total aid disbursed by multilateral 
and bilateral donors), excluding Spanish aid, is included in the analysis so as to test the 
existence of a “bandwagon effect” in the allocation. 
  
4.3.2– Donor’s interests 
 
Spain’s economic and geo-strategic interests are proxied by means of the following variables: 
 
The analysis shall test the importance of the special historical and cultural links in the aid 
allocation by means of a qualitative, dummy, variable, with two categories: “d_col = 1, if the 
country was part of the Spanish colonial Empire” and “d_col = 0, otherwise”. 
 
Trade interests are evaluated by means of the share of each developing country on Spanish 
exports; on the other hand, the investment interests are measured by the net stock of Spanish 
investment in each developing country, accumulated since 1990. It should be pointed out that, 
given that part of the ODA consists of “tied loans” (i.e. conditional credits upon the purchase 
of Spanish equipment), there is a potential risk of simultaneity between exports and aid 
disbursements. Nevertheless, exports are lagged one year, which reduces the risk of 
simultaneity, since tied aid stimulates, mainly, the current year exports. 
 
4.3.3– Determinant factors of aid effectiveness 
 
In order to approximate the partner countries’ commitment with democracy and the respect of 
 human rights, this paper uses the aggregate indicators of the Polity IV Project (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2005), which offer comprehensive information on the characteristics of the different 
countries’ political regimes
42. In particular, it will use the POLITY2 synthetic indicator, which 
treats different aspects related to the institutionalization of democratic and autocratic regimes, 
codifying them within the interval between –10 (strong autocratic regime) and +10 (strong 
democratic regime). Thus, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive, reflecting  
Spanish support for more democratic countries. However, it should be pointed out that the 
level of democracy can also be interpreted as indicative of a country’s need for aid, thus 
expecting an indirect relation with the allocation
43. In fact, the Spanish Aid Plan defines the 
so-called group of countries “with special attention” as those suffering “special 
circumstances”, such as the necessity of preventing conflicts or contributing to building peace 
and the weak respect for human rights and the democratic system. 
 
Moreover, the recipient economy’s absorptive capacity is proxied by means of the ratio of the 
total ODA –bilateral and multilateral– received by the country to its GNI (ODA/GNI ratio). 
Nevertheless, to date there is not a clear consensus on an objective and measurable variable in 
which to trace the threshold where aid becomes unproductive. Some studies have used the 
ratio of foreign direct investment to the recipient country’s GNI as an indicator of its capacity 
to absorb external financial resources, assuming that capital imports are a good indicator of 
the absorptive capacity if aid is used to finance the capital accumulation. However, this 
                                                 
41 The use of the infant mortality rate raises serious concerns, as there are not available complete time series data, 
but five-year values. 
42 The Polity IV Project comprises all independent States with more than 500,000 inhabitants. 
43 Vid a review on the recent literature on fragile States in McGillivray (2006). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 23 
 
criterion does not consider other aid policies that are not targeted to finance capital 
accumulation, but the provision of public services. Other studies have used the ratio of ODA 
commitments to disbursements, which partially reflects the capability of the recipient 
government to administrate the committed resources. However, Spain does not report on aid 
commitments, whereas the ODA/GNI ratios are widely available among developing countries, 
offering a reasonable measure of the recipient economy’s aid-dependency level
44. 
 
4.3.4– Aid’s path dependence 
 
The present model includes the variable Aj,t-1 (previous year ODA-quota) in the aid-partners 
selection stage in order to capture the path dependence of the geographical allocations, 
assuming that previous disbursements positively influence the probability of being “re-
selected” as a aid-partner
45. This factor has scarcely been considered in the literature, 
although authors such as Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) used, inter alia, a proxy variable of the 
“past results” so as to measure the aid effectiveness and estimate its inertia on the 
allocations
46, and Feeny and McGillivray (2002) and Feeny (2003) used, on the other hand, 
previous year aid disbursements (although this option was possible within a time-series SUR 
analysis, but it turns more complicated within a panel data
47  regression ). 
                                                
 
Moreover, it should be born in mind that, to a certain extent, aid is middle-term oriented (e.g. 
programme aid and those projects that are extended over time
48) and, in certain occasions, it 
has a structural character for the recipient economy which implies a political commitment 
between donor and recipient; both reasons therefore constitute a relevant factor of inertia in 
the aid allocation. In the end, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the aid-quotas 
allocation stage with panel data introduces an important bias in the estimation due to the 
existence of autocorrelation, and for this practical reason the lagged dependent variable is not 
included in this estimation stage. 
 
4.4. Model  specification 
 
As equations [9] and [19] specify, the model is transformed in a linear function by means of 
the natural logarithm, thus facilitating the interpretation of the coefficients in terms of 
elasticities and reducing the heteroskedasticity among observations
49. 
 
44 It is worth mentioning that high rates of ODA/GNI may stem from a “bandwagon effect” among donors’ 
allocations; however, this variable, in the case of Spanish aid, is not significantly correlated with the ODA 
received by the rest of the donors (r
2 = –0.0304), ruling out the existence of a simultaneity problem. 
45 In the Spanish context, there has been a high year-by-year variation of the aid-quotas, in contrast with the 
relative stability of the list of partner countries. In fact, the average coefficient of variation of these quotas 
between 1993 and 2005 was 0.655: i.e. on average, the inter-annual variation of a partner country’s quota was 
65.5%. In this sense, the aid’s inertia has been especially important in the selection stage, but not as much in the 
aid-quota stage, which vary considerably year by year Author calculations with OECD: DAC (2007) data: 
developing countries’ quotas on Spanish ODA gross disbursements. 
46 Isopi and Mavrotas (2006) study the aid giving patterns of 20 DAC bilateral donors. They used the World 
Bank’s Operations and Evaluations Department (OED) aid economic rate of return of the World Bank projects. 
They assumed that bilateral donors’ efficiency levels are the same as those ones of the World Bank (inter alia 
effectiveness). This assumption is due to the fact that the World Bank is the only donor that systematically 
measures the results of its projects. 
47 Their analysis was actually restricted to the 11 main recipient countries. 
48 As Bulir and Hamann (2003) pointed out, aid projects also have a relevant inertial character, since they flow 
gradually according to multi-year disbursement schedules and their sudden cancellation or interruption may be 
very costly. 
49 The only exception is the POLITY2, which is expressed in its original rank units, since it does not accept 
reasonable interpretations in terms of elasticities. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 24 
 
In order to access the information available for the Spanish aid decision-makers in a realistic 
way, the explanatory variables are specified with different time lags. As was previously 
explained, the Spanish co-operation budgetary process begins with the approval, at the end of 
the preceding year, of the General Public Budget. Furthermore, the lengths of the lags are 
specified in accordance with the time-delay that takes place in the provision of international 
statistics
50: in the case of per capita incomes, population levels, death rates and absorptive 
capacities, decision-makers faced a 2-year information lag (see Table 2). The share on 
Spanish exports, foreign investment and POLITY2 are lagged one year
51. Finally, as explained 
previously, the inertia variable is measured with a one year lag. This lag structure also reduces 
the potential simultaneity bias between the aid allocation and the explanatory variables. 
 
4.5.  Sample and period of analysis 
 
The sample includes the 178 developing economies referred by the successive DAC lists of 
ODA recipient countries, published from 1993 to 2005. 130 of these countries received 
Spanish ODA at least one year. 74 countries were eventually excluded from the analysis due 
to a lack of information; nevertheless, the missing countries respond to very different socio-
demographic and economic profiles, a fact which limits the existence of a sample selection 
bias: they are countries in conflict or post-conflict situations (such as Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Somalia), territories whose independence have not been formally reconnoitred (Palestine and 
Western Sahara), countries which lack statistical information (Cuba, North Korea, East 
Timor, Liberia and Libya) and/or islands and regions with less than one million inhabitants (a 
great deal of them are the least-developed countries: Wallis and Futuna, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Santa Helena, Niue, Nauru, Montserrat, Mayote, Cook Islands and 
Anguila), which have received very limited attention from Spanish co-operation. The Annex 
shows the 104 developing countries included in the analysis. 
 
The period of analysis comprises 13 years of Spanish assistance, from 1993 to 2005 (the last 
year with available information). For those variables with one or two year lags, the 
information was analyzed starting from 1992 or 1991, respectively. The period of analysis 
excludes the first “gestation” stage of the Spanish aid system (1986–92), so as to focus the 
study on the time when it was already consolidated. 
 
5.  THE SPANISH PATTERN OF GEOGRAPHICAL AID ALLOCATION 
 
5.1.  Selection of aid-partner countries 
 
During the period 1993–2005 Spain has selected its aid-partners mainly guided by factors of 
interest and inertia of its foreign policy (Table 3): in particular, it has been directly influenced 
by the post-colonial links, the reception of Spanish aid and exports in the previous year and 
the resources received by the rest of the donors. Nevertheless, the selection process has 




                                                 
50 In fact, the Aid Plan explicitly points out that less developed countries will be identified by means of the 
socioeconomic indicators elaborated by international organizations. 
51 The share on global ODA is not lagged. The specification test pointed out that the Spanish aid allocation is 
specially related to the current year aid disbursements of the rest of the donors; moreover, the estimation results 
do not change upon the number of lags included in this variable. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 25 
 
Table 3. Estimation of the Spanish selection of aid-partner countries. 1993–2005 
 
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1279 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =       104 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         4 
                                                               avg =      12.3 
                                                               max =        13 
                                                LR chi2(10)        =    245.43 
Log likelihood  = -255.15245                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          D  |         OR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |   1.237373    .456867     0.58   0.564      .600091    2.551433 
     lnPOPt-2 |   .8354529   .1471694    -1.02   0.307     .5915321    1.179955 
      lnDRt  |   1.381162   .5396969     0.83   0.409     .6421441    2.970684  -2
   lna_others|   1.410425    .227055     2.14   0.033     1.028776    1.933657 
     lnEXPt-1 |   1.338513    .192901     2.02   0.043     1.009139    1.775392 
     lnFDIt-1 |   .8846312   .0908555    -1.19   0.233      .723336    1.081893 
       d_COL |   5.772276   2.516516     4.02   0.000     2.456135    13.56569 
        P2t-1 |   .9966861   .0264699    -0.12   0.901     .9461332     1.04994 
      lnACt-2 |   1.238793   .2931163     0.91   0.365     .7790985    1.969724 
       lnat-1 |   3.714909    .504239     9.67   0.000     2.847156    4.847134 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsig2u |  -2.015583   1.722081                     -5.390799    1.359633 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .3650243   .3143006                      .0675154    1.973515 
         rho |   .0389244   .0644219                      .0013836    .5420965 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: White’s (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
 
The OR column in Table 3 shows the odds ratio of being selected as a partner country (i.e. 
the ratio between the probability of being selected and the probability of not being so) when 
one of the explanatory variables of the model increases one-unit, ceteris paribus
52. Hence the 
highest odds ratio is associated to the variable of Spanish colonial past. The interpretation of 
this coefficient in the case of two-category dummy variables is relatively simple: for two 
developing countries with identical values in the set of explanatory variables, but with 
different post-colonial links, it shows the difference between their probabilities of being 
selected partners. According to the estimation, the odds ratio for a former colony is 5.8 times 
greater than for a country without this historical link, a result that stems from the fact that 
only 79 of the 273 observations of the colonial past included in the panel data set (20 ex-
colonies analyzed along 13 years
53) did not –significantly– participate in the Spanish AOD
54. 
The aid’s path dependence also exerts an outstanding effect, imprinting a certain character of 
“persistence” in the selection process, in such a way that a one-percentage increase in the 
Spanish ODA-quota allocated the previous year to a developing country multiplies by 3.7 its 
odds of being re-selected as a partner. This path dependence of the Spanish aid is strongly 
linked to the special inclination towards the ex-colonial countries, which is further reinforced 
by the strong specialization of the Spanish NGOs’ in Latin America, Equatorial Guinea and 
North Africa. 
                                                 
52 Formally, when variable xi increases one-unit, ceteris paribus, the odds ratio is multiplied by a factor equal to 
e
xi. 
53 Cuba is not included in the analysis due to the lack of information. 
54 Particularly: Argentina (1999–2001), Colombia (1993), Costa Rica (1992–95, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2005), 
Cuba (1992–94), Chile (1997–2005), Dominican Republic (1992–94), El Salvador (1992–94), Equatorial Guinea 
(2003), Guatemala (1992–94), Honduras (1992), Mexico (1996, 1997, 1999–2001, 2003 and 2004), Nicaragua 
(1992), Panama (1992–95 and 2002–05), Paraguay (1992–94, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005), Peru (1992–
94), Philippines (1992 and 1996), Uruguay (1996–2002 and 2004) and Venezuela (1992–95, 1998, 2004 and 
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The other two statistically significant variables have a less decisive influence in the selection 
process: on the one hand, a one-percent increase in the share of Spanish exports increases the 
odds of selection by 34%, which, to a great extent, reflects the convergence of trade and aid 
interests. On the other hand, a one-percent increment in the share of global aid increases the 
odds of selection by almost 41%. This result confirms that Spain has been influenced by a 
“bandwagon effect”, which suggests three –not necessarily exclusive– possible explanations: 
either Spain perceives that ODA is more effective in those countries that receive more 
resources from the rest of the donors; or that the donors’ international community –including 
Spain– agrees when assisting the “neediest” countries, thus selecting a fairly similar group of 
partners; or, finally, that the regions where donors share strong geo-strategic interests (mainly, 
the Middle East and the largest developing countries) are, in turn, regions of interest for 
Spain; such is the case of countries like Israel (which received ODA until 1996, being one of 
the world’s main aid recipients), Egypt, China, India and Indonesia, which –except for India– 
have been aid partners during the 13 years analysed
55. In the end, a positive coefficient of this 
variable reflects a lack of coordination with the rest of international donors in the definition of 
their “intervention areas”, which may reinforce the existence of the so-called aid “darlings” 
and “orphan” countries, or a excessive fragmentation of the Spanish interventions due to the 
attempts to catch up with the interests of the international community, even at the expense of 
over-scattering the resources. 
 
The implications of this selection pattern can be illustrated with an example of the year 2005: 
the Dominican Republic and Tunisia had similar levels of per capita income, population, 
death rates, net stocks of Spanish investment and absorptive capacities, but they had 
outstanding differences regarding their colonial past, the aid receptions (both from Spain and 
from the rest of the donors) and the share of Spanish exports (i.e. they differ in the four 
statistically significant variables in the selection stage). The probabilities of these two 
countries being selected as aid partners are calculated by means of the probability model 
estimated in Table 3, using the following expression
56: 
 
Z = 1,1554 + 0,213·lnGDPpct-2,j – 0,1798·lnPOPt-2,j + 0,323·lnDRt-2,j + 0,3439·lna_otherst,j + 
0,2916·lnEXPt-1,j – 0,1226·lnFDIt-1,j + 1,7531·d_colj + 0,0033·P2t-1,j + 0,2141·lnACt-2,j +   
1,3123·lnat-1,j + ut,j           [ 2 3 ]  
 
Hence, substituting the corresponding values for Tunisia and the Dominican Republic yields 
that, whereas the probability of selecting the first country is 0.47, the probability of the second 
rises to 0.9 (Table 4)
 57. In fact, the recipient’s colonial past and the aid’s inertia determine, to 
                                                 
55 Since this estimation-stage only analyses whether a developing country is chosen or not as aid-partner, it does 
not consider the amount of resources finally disbursed. 
56 Table 3 offers the odds ratio coefficients, whereas equation [23] uses the coefficients of the logistic 
probability model. 
57 The calculations are as follows, with the variables logarithmically transformed: 
Dominican Rep.: Z  =  1,1554 + 0,213·6.784,92 – 0,1798·8.640.648 + 0,323·6,46 + 0,3439·0,1 + 0,2916·0,14 – 
0,1226·597,06 + 1,7531·1 + 0,0033·8 + 0,2141·1,14 +  1,3123·4,05 =  2,3695 
3695 , 2 2005 . . , 2005 1
1
) 1 ( − +
= = =
e
X AOD E P R Dom j = 0,90042 
Tunisia:  Z = 1,1554 + 0,213·6.790,8 – 0,1798·9.839.800 + 0,323·6,1 + 0,3439·0,52 + 0,2916·0,39 – 
0,1226·301,01 + 1,7531·0 + 0,0033·(–4) + 0,2141·1,63 +  1,3123·1,11 = –0,1635 
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a large extent, the different probabilities of being aid partners (if Tunisia were a Spanish 
former colony, its selection probability would have been 0.54). 
 




















Regarding the goodness-of-fit of the model, the χ
2 test  of overall significance rejects the 
hypothesis that all the variables exert a simultaneously null effect in the selection (vid p-value 
in Table 3)
58. From a different perspective, the classification Table 5 evaluates the model’s 
overall accuracy by means of the R
2 count. Since the dependent variable of the logit model 
takes values between 0 and 1, if a country’s predicted probability for a specific year is greater 
than 0.5, the case is classified as D = 1 (“selected partner”) and, otherwise, it is classified as D 
= 0 (“non selected partner”). The statistic is defined as follows: 
 
R
2 count = № of correctly classified cases / Total №  of  cases     [24] 
 
The model correctly classifies 91.8% of the cases, offering a reasonable fit that allows us to 
trust the accuracy of the estimates.  Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the model 
“gets wrong” in a slightly asymmetric way, since the percentage of “actual partners” 
incorrectly classified as non-recipients (16.1%, vid “false – rate for true D”) is greater than the 
percentage of “actual non-recipients” incorrectly classified as partners (5.6%, vid “false + rate 
for true ~D”): i.e. most of the prediction errors are located among the group of countries that 
were actually aid-partners (50 cases were erroneously predicted as non-partners, when they 
actually received Spanish aid, among 310 observations of positive aid disbursements). 
Moreover, the high “sensitivity ratio” (83.9%, the percentage of observations with a 
probability greater than 0.5 given the event D = 1) and “specificity ratio” (94.4%, the 
percentage of observations with a probability smaller than 0.5 given the event D = 0) confirm 







                                                 
58 Nevertheless, as Gujarati (2003, p. 585) points out, “the goodness-of-fit of a binary independent variable 
model is not as important. What matters are the predicted signs of the regression coefficients and their practical 
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Table 5. Classification table 
 
Logistic model for D 
 
                -------- True -------- 
Classified |         D            ~D  |      Total 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
     +     |       260            54  |        314 
     -     |        50           915  |        965 
-----------+--------------------------+----------- 
   Total   |       310           969  |       1279 
 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5 
True D defined as D != 0 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   83.87% 
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   94.43% 
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   82.80% 
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   94.82% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)    5.57% 
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   16.13% 
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   17.20% 
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)    5.18% 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Correctly classified                        91.87% 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
There is, however, a certain number of observations that deviate from the historical 
criteria. Graph 2 points out the model’s erroneously classified cases. The value of the 
Cook’s dD distance statistic measures to what extent an individual observation affects the 
model’s estimation, identifying the outliers. Moreover, the diameters of the circles depicted 
in the graph are proportional to the dD statistics, indicating the levels of “influence” of each 
observation. The points are distributed along two curves that intercept each other forming an 
X: the curve with a negative slope depicts those cases classified as D = 0, and the curve with 
positive slope, those cases with D = 1. Hence, the points located above the intersection (i.e. 
Pr(D=1) = 0.5) represent the incorrectly classified cases. As previously remarked, most of the 
prediction errors are located among those countries that were actually chosen as partners 
(upper right-side cross); nevertheless, the cases with greater dD statistic values (i.e. those that 
have a greater influence in the estimation of the model) are in fact those where the model gets 
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Table 6 gathers those cases with especially high dD statistics (greater than 4), showing the 
values of the explanatory variables that are statistically significant. In particular, there are 25 
outliers among the cases erroneously classified. Since the binary variable of colonial past does 
not vary over time, the prediction errors stem from the time changes in the rest of the 
explanatory variables, mainly in the previous year Spanish aid-quota (which is the variable 
that exerts a greater influence in the selection process, after the colonial past). For example, 
the non-selection of Algeria (DZA) as an aid partner in 1996 is atypical since this is the only 
year when this country did not receive a quota greater than 1%
59. In short, in spite of these 
prediction errors, only 4 observations exert considerable influence in the estimation (with dD 
statistics greater than 7): Kazakstan (KAZ), which, since 2001, started to be selected as a 
partner, in spite of the fact that its share of the global aid decreased to less than half the 
percentage of 2000, and its share of Spanish exports increased more than 64% coinciding with 
the boom of the energy sector; Pakistan (PAK), which was selected as an aid partner for the 
first time in 1995, despite the 52% reduction of its share of the global aid (remaining constant 
its share of Spanish exports); Serbia and Montenegro (YGU), which participated for the first 
time in Spain’s aid in 1999 (the same year of the NATO’s bombing and the eventual 
withdrawal of Serbian military forces from Kosovo); and Zimbabwe (ZWE), which only in 
1998 received more than 1% of the Spanish resources, just before its involvement in the war 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1998 and 2002, which drained hundreds of 
millions of dollars from the economy (including ODA)
60. All in all, it should be noticed that 
all these outliers are not Spanish ex-colonies. 
                                                 
59 Algeria has mainly received concessional loans: on average, during the period 1993–2005, 84% of the ODA 
gross disbursements were loans. Nevertheless, in 1996 Spain granted a 3.91 million dollars loan, which amounts 
for 1.5% of the 266.8 million dollars loans disbursed during this period. 
60 In 1998, the Spanish aid to Zimbabwe was especially high due to the financing of two NGO projects that 
amounted for 504.779 euros (i.e. 78% of the aid). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 30 
 




| code   D     t        dD        Phat    a_others     EXPt-1      at-1   d_col| 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  ALB   1   1999   6.504288   .0394723   1.281035   .0073781   .1398881   0 | 
|  DZA   0   1996   4.872884   .9100598   1.407114   1.106966   4.476449   0 | 
|  ARG   0   1999   4.565558   .8948497   .1514462   1.170665   2.996065   1 | 
|  CMR   1   1997   6.358152   .0420865   .7513528   .0246994   .1369418   0 | 
|  IDN   0   1998   5.665606   .9394612    6.97345   .3502355   6.938419   0 | 
|  IDN   0   2002   4.429478   .8876536   3.416168   .1482162   6.119036   0 | 
|  IDN   1   2004   4.423911   .1117623    2.68214   .1363075   .3266251   0 | 
|  JOR   1   2001   4.978118   .0852307   .8090472    .052949   .2379527   0 | 
|  KAZ   1   2001   13.19212   .0013698   .2562773   .0089432   .0214925   0 | 
|  KEN   1   2001   4.697541   .0980744   .8190375   .0189441   .3914706   0 | 
|  MEX   0   1996   4.538678   .8939921   .2553762   .6327707   3.182768   1 | 
|  MEX   0   1999   4.223968   .8760008   .2375984   1.092884   2.897682   1 | 
|  NAM   1   2004   4.012984   .1396786   .2515925   .0201021   .4496264   0 | 
|  PAK   1   1995   20.00433   .0000453   1.906945   .0725852          0   0 | 
|  PRY   1   1995    4.24597   .1227246   .2376639   .0217508    .149554   1 | 
|  PHL   0   1996   4.239976   .8771372   1.729418   .0779721   2.026248   1 | 
|  SEN   1   2001   4.056742   .1353324   1.090491   .0589565   .2594452   0 | 
|  YUG   1   1999   11.25733   .0036249   2.188222   .0212174    .019984   0 | 
|  YUG   0   2000   4.817358   .9028446   3.280104   .0249088   5.610472   0 | 
|  YUG   1   2001   4.572191   .1042901   2.588447   .0242505   .1995732   0 | 
|  TUN   1   1995   4.379813   .1149575   .8877262   .2942725   .2051404   0 | 
|  URY   0   1996   5.225182   .9247659   .0602164   .2081395   3.176533   1 | 
|  URY   1   2003   4.452602    .111934    .037646   .0728301    .239482   1 | 
|  URY   1   2005   4.310884   .1210616   .0746806   .0407584   .2471433   1 | 
|  ZWE   1   1998   7.618703   .0225087   .7757553   .0136811   .0874056   0 | 
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
* Cases with dD ≥ 4 
Phat: estimated probability of selection 
 
However, these 4 especially influential outliers do not significantly affect the estimates. Table 
7 shows the regression results once these outliers are excluded. The list of statistically 
significant variables is exactly the same as in Table 3, although the strong influence of the 
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Table 7. Estimation of the Spanish selection of aid-partner countries. 1993–2005
* 
 
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =      1276 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =       104 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         4 
                                                               avg =      12.3 
                                                               max =        13 
                                                LR chi2(10)        =    267.06 
Log likelihood  = -238.03726                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          D |         OR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |     1.0559   .3906761     0.15   0.883      .511309    2.180528 
     lnPOPt-2 |   .8227497   .1450992    -1.11   0.269     .5823054    1.162478 
      lnDRt  |    1.20029   .4635791     0.47   0.636      .563032    2.558818  -2
   lna_others|   1.343871   .2208526     1.80   0.072     .9738021    1.854576 
     lnEXPt-1 |     1.4792    .222873     2.60   0.009      1.10097    1.987369 
     lnFDIt-1 |    .875197   .0893941    -1.31   0.192     .7164116    1.069176 
       d_COL |   5.121348   2.174357     3.85   0.000     2.228393    11.77001 
        P2t-1 |   1.014479   .0267608     0.54   0.586     .9633619    1.068309 
      lnACt-2 |   1.376701   .3301993     1.33   0.183     .8603607    2.202921 
       lnat-1 |   4.381146   .6354891    10.18   0.000      3.29701    5.821773 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnsig2u |  -3.019102   4.221723                     -11.29353    5.255322 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .2210091   .4665197                      .0035289    13.84136 
         rho |   .0146299   .0608598                      3.79e-06    .9831179 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Notes: White’s (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
* Excluding the outliers with dD ≥ 7 
 
5.2.  Allocation of aid-quotas among partner countries 
 
The analysis of the second-step allocation decision distinguishes between two groups of 
partner countries: those that have post-colonial links with Spain, and those without this 
historical legacy. These two groups received, respectively, 57.8% and 42.2% of the 
accumulated aid resources during 1993–2005, despite their unequal participation in the 
sample, both in terms of the number of countries (20 and 84 countries, respectively, in the 
panel data set of the first-step estimation), and population (which, consequently, implies a 
strong ODA per capita allocation bias in favour of the ex-colonies, which, on average, 




Firstly, 25 countries without post-colonial links took part, for at least one year, in Spain’s 
ODA with quotas greater than 1%. The analysis reveals the lack of a systematic pattern of 
humanitarian aid allocation which has not been guided by the recipients’ needs and specially 
benefits those countries with higher levels of income per capita, although it has been sensitive 
to population sizes. Spanish trade interests have reinforced the aid allocation, unlike the 
investment interests, which have been inversely related to aid. Moreover, Spain has benefited 
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Table 7. Estimation of the Spanish pattern of ODA geographical allocation. Countries 
without post-colonial links. 1993–2005 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       117 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        25 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1802                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5000                                        avg =       4.7 
       overall = 0.5417                                        max =        13 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(8)       =     72.75 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lna |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |   .5626937   .1562729     3.60   0.000     .2564044    .8689829 
     lnPOBt-2 |   .2797479   .0836134     3.35   0.001     .1158687    .4436272 
      lnDRt-2 |   .0419105   .2226739     0.19   0.851    -.3945223    .4783433 
   lna_others|   .0548938     .10018     0.55   0.584    -.1414554     .251243 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .1549511   .0553858     2.80   0.005      .046397    .2635052 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.3356915   .0741509    -4.53   0.000    -.4810246   -.1903583 
        P2t-1 |  -.0173776   .0113052    -1.54   0.124    -.0395354    .0047801 
      lnACt-2 |   .3900336    .115643     3.37   0.001     .1633775    .6166897 
       _cons |  -7.419358   2.126794    -3.49   0.000     -11.5878   -3.250919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .22739736 
     sigma_e |  .42330668 
         rho |   .2239497   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: White’s  (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
 
In particular, a one-percentage increase in the recipient country’s per capita income –ceteris 
paribus– has been associated with a 0.56% increase in the ODA disbursement, which does not 
correspond with a progressive allocation criterion. By contrast, Spanish assistance has been 
sensitive to the partners’ different population sizes, although a one-percentage increase in the 
receiving population has led to a less than proportional increase in the aid disbursement 
(0.28%). These last two results are due to, to a large extent, the distribution pattern with the 
highly populated countries: on the one hand, Spain has continuously co-operated with China 
(which has attracted a large share of the FAD loans), and, for several years, with Indonesia, 
Brazil, Pakistan, Vietnam, Egypt and Turkey (each of these countries had more than 75 
million inhabitants in 2005, and only two of them are not middle-income economies: Pakistan 
and Vietnam); on the other hand, the poorest and highly populated countries (especially India, 
Nigeria and Bangladesh) did not ever receive aid-quotas greater than 1% (thus, not being 
considered in this estimation stage). These facts explain the preference for the more populated 
partners and the regressive middle-income countries bias. 
 
The aid-exports elasticity has been positive (0.15%), thus supporting Spanish trade interests, 
which coincides with the previously remarked result of the partners’ selection process. At the 
same time, some of the main trade partners are middle-income and highly populated countries 
(particularly China, Brazil and Turkey) that offer especially attractive markets for Spanish 
products. 
 
Furthermore, a one-percentage increase in the stock of Spanish investment has led to a –
0.34% decrease in the aid-quota, and a similar increase in the partner country’s ODA/GNI 
ratio has increased it by 0.39%. These results reflect a special attention towards those highly 
aid-dependent developing economies that attract less investment. In some ways, the lower 
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disbursing greater amounts of concessional resources. This has been the case of highly aid-
dependent economies (with ODA/GNI ratios over 20% in several years) that have been aid 
partners of Spain, such as Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea and, more 
recently, Mauritania, Senegal and Angola, which, besides, have attracted less Spanish 
investment than other developing economies
62. All these countries are, on the other hand, 
prioritised in the current Aid Plan. 
 
Secondly, there is a significantly different pattern of aid allocation regarding the 20 countries 
with post-colonial links with Spain, which corresponds to a more balanced strategy of altruist 
motivations and foreign policy interests (Table 8). The aid-quotas have been distributed in 
direct proportion to the partner countries’ needs (assessed by means of the per capita GDP 
and the population size), and have backed Spanish trade interests, being, by contrast, 
inversely related to the investment orientations. However, other variables related to the 
recipients’ absorptive capacity and level of democracy have not exerted a significant 
influence in the distribution. 
 
Table 8. Estimation of the Spanish pattern of ODA geographical allocation. Countries with 
post-colonial links. 1993–2005 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       193 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        20 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2677                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.2727                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.1045                                        max =        13 
                                                F(8,165)           =      6.50 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9962                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lna   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |  -.4640383   .1414169    -3.28   0.001    -.7432582   -.1848184 
     lnPOBt-2 |   4.021031   .9840364     4.09   0.000     2.078105    5.963958 
      lnDRt-2 |   .1085396   .9641113     0.11   0.911    -1.795046    2.012125 
   lna_others|  -.0354341   .0574121    -0.62   0.538    -.1487912     .077923 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .3359423    .082892     4.05   0.000     .1722765    .4996081 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.2550163   .0555764    -4.59   0.000    -.3647489   -.1452836 
        P2t-1 |  -.0357236   .0306168    -1.17   0.245    -.0961749    .0247277 
      lnACt-2 |  -.0028646   .1268188    -0.02   0.982    -.2532614    .2475322 
       _cons |  -58.12898   16.52016    -3.52   0.001    -90.74714   -25.51082 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.8877226 
     sigma_e |  .41780618 
         rho |  .99274605   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: White’s (heteroskedasticity-adjusted) robust errors 
 
In particular, regarding the variables related to the recipients’ needs, the following results are 
worth remarking: on the one hand, a one-percentage increase in the partner’s per capita 
income –if other variables stay the same– has been less than proportionally compensated by a 
–0.46% decrease in the aid-quota. This results shows certain sensitivity towards the 
recipients’ levels of economic development, although it does not characterize a strictly 
progressive allocation, since the per capita income coefficient is smaller than one. 
Furthermore, a one-percentage increase in the population size has led to a more than 
proportional (4%) increase in the aid-quota, which rules out the existence of a small country 
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bias within the group of ex-colonies; on the contrary, countries with higher populations have 
tended to receive proportionally greater amounts of resources than the smaller ones –once the 
effects of the rest of the explanatory variables are controlled. 
 
Regarding the trade and investment interests, on the one hand, Spain has tended to 
concentrate its aid on its main trade partners (with the export coefficient equal to 0.34%). This 
result is due to, to a certain extent, the distribution criteria in proportion to the recipient’s 
population, since the largest countries offer broader markets for Spanish products. Moreover, 
it should be born in mind that Spanish exports are specially concentrated on the group of ex-
colonies: these 21 economies (among 126 countries included in the initial data set, i.e. without 
excluding those that lack the necessary information) absorbed, on average, 5.82% of the 
period’s aggregated exports, in contrast with the 9.36% of the remaining 105 countries. 
Consequently, given the high concentration of resources in this group of recipients –both in 
terms of aid and exports–, trade interests have exerted a greater influence among the former 
colonies than among the more heterogeneous group of non ex-colonial countries. On the other 
hand, a one-percentage increase in the stock of investment has led to a marginal decrease in 
the aid-quota (–0.25%), since the lower relative development of the ex-colonies that received 
higher shares of aid implies less opportunities for Spanish investors. In the end, both results 
show that trade and investment priorities have two different association patterns with aid –as 
also happened in the selection stage. 
 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that, although Spain’s selection of aid-partners has been 
affected by the “bandwagon effect” –as it was shown in the previous section–, this has not 
been the case in the process of allocating the aid-quotas. This is due to, on the one hand, the 
different “implications” of both decision-steps: the first stage deals with the partners 
selection, but does not measure the “intensity” of the eventually established co-operation 
relations (i.e. the model captures the similarities between Spain’s and the rest of donors’ 
selections, without assessing the final disbursements). On the other hand, the separate 
estimation of the aid-quota stage between countries with historical links with Spain (most of 
them middle-income countries) and countries without these links hinders the geographical 
coincidences with the rest of the donors. In fact, the partial correlation between the Spanish 
and the rest of donors aid allocations has been positive (0.23), although it has not been 
possible to estimate its effect on the full sample of partner countries due to the impossibility 
of including the colonial dummy variable in the fixed-effects panel data model. When the 
group of ex-colonial countries is separately analysed (again, Table 8), Spanish aid 
disbursements appear to have been negatively correlated with those of the rest of donors, 
although its effect has been economically and statistically non significant. In any event, the 
aid bias towards middle-income countries –consequence of the specialization in the ex-
colonies, with only Equatorial Guinea classified as a non middle-income economy– cannot be 
interpreted as an effort to coordinate the Spanish interventions with the rest of the donors, but 
it may rather respond to the interest of both compensating these countries for their lower 
participation in the global aid (especially Latin Americans), and taking advantage of the 
cultural affinities –affinities that, on the other hand, this group of countries does not share 
with any other donor. 
 
With respect to the model’s goodness-of-fit, the F test verifies the null hypothesis whether or 
not all coefficients of the model are simultaneously equal to zero; hypothesis that is flatly 
rejected in both estimation groups (vid p-values = 0,0000 in the upper-left corners of Tables 7 
and 8). 
 QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 35 
 
Also, both estimations offer reasonable adjustments. Graphs 3 a and b show the dispersions 
among the residuals ( ) and the predicted aid-quotas ( ), which do not reveal the 
existence of a systematic distribution pattern. Nevertheless, there is a certain number of 
outliers that should be carefully analysed: 
jt u ˆ jt a ˆ
 
Graphs 3. Residuals Vs. predicted aid-quotas 
 
a)  Countries without post-colonial links 
 
























b)  Countries with post-colonial links 
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With regard to the countries without Spanish post-colonial links, 18 observations have 
residuals greater than |0.6| (Table 9). Among them, 5 countries had outliers that may be 
especially influencing the estimation (with residuals greater than |0.8|): 
 




| code         a       t     a_hat       resid    GDPpct-2      POBt-2      EXPt-1      FDIt-1      ACt-2 | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  DZA   7.555785   1994    1.22578    .7865841    5249.76   2.65e+07   1.296022    41.4426    1.285 | 
|  AGO   6.819229   1997   1.263572     .761645    1655.23   1.23e+07   .0920603   10.29244   12.024 | 
|  AGO   5.360352   1999   1.035831    .7486699   1656.071   1.29e+07   .0905685   10.29244    6.223 | 
|  AGO   1.417663   2001   1.203541   -.7490601   1901.438   1.35e+07   .0574195   10.29244    8.906 | 
|  CMR    3.60588   1997   .5349435    .6072571    1666.15   1.33e+07   .0246994   30.07298    6.659 | 
|  CHN   15.76505   1993   1.682873    .9453929   1720.847   1.15e+09   .4215704   31.96746    1.203 | 
|  CHN   20.43199   1994   1.948584    .9389876   1944.442   1.16e+09   1.066117   32.03767    1.407 | 
|  CHN   3.283527   1998   1.832606   -.7732178   2971.178   1.22e+09   .4591171   44.37808    1.004 | 
|  IDN   2.072849   1999   1.189574   -.6024644   3300.046   1.98e+08   .0944877    36.0723    1.077 | 
|  IDN   10.14139   2000   1.248149    .9266611   2909.631   2.01e+08   .1437383   37.09064    2.095 | 
|  IDN   1.713587   2004   1.037011   -.6402369   3073.792   2.12e+08   .1363075   44.17144    1.363 | 
|  IDN   1.697675   2005   .9969718   -.6095268   3212.742   2.15e+08   .1070798   50.36673    1.449 | 
|  SEN   3.639389   2003   .4371834    .7424297   1459.988   1.06e+07   .0693755   35.21477    9.881 | 
|  YUG   5.610472   1999   .4666017    .9722767       4700   1.06e+07   .0212174         30    1.277 | 
|  TUR   4.296774   2003   .5457157    .8057522   6038.418   6.85e+07   1.091035    291.771     .808 | 
|  TUR   4.529744   2004   .5963083    .8079603   6404.543   6.96e+07   1.257686   294.6033     .915 | 
|  TUR   1.130324   2005   .6571608   -.6410528   6667.618   7.07e+07   1.769192   292.2866     .759 | 
|  VNM    1.04031   2001   1.248587   -.8913491   1907.903   7.75e+07   .0436889         30    5.738 | 
+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Notes:  
* Observsations with  | | > 8  jt u ˆ
 a_hat: predicted aid-quota 
 
In first place, the case of China (CHN) stands out: in 1993 and 1994 it received 15.8% and 
20.4% of the Spanish ODA, respectively, whereas the model predicts quotas of less than 2%. 
These discrepancies owed to the 140.1 and 153.12 million dollars of FAD loans granted in 
these two years (that amounted to 99.12% and 99.18% of the Spanish aid disbursed to China, 
respectively). Nevertheless, one year later (1995), Spain’s ODA decreased almost to a third of 
its previous-year value, so that the gross disbursements have been, up to 2005, around 50 
million dollars per year (which represents between 4.6% and 8.9% of the donor’s aid). 
 
In second place, Indonesia (IDN), in 2000, received 10.14% of the Spanish aid, in contrast to 
the 1.25% predicted quota, thus increasing 4.8 times its 1999 share due to the grant of a 65.87 
million FAD loan, which amounted to 99.7% of the received aid. Nevertheless, three years 
later (2003), Spain had to condone 6.52 millions of this debt. 
 
In third place, in 1999, Serbia and Montenegro (YGU) received an aid-quota 12 times greater 
than the predicted one. In this case, most of the resources were grants aimed at promoting the 
peacemaking process of the Balkans. 
 
In fourth place, Turkey (TUR) received in 2003 and 2004 much greater quotas than the 
predicted ones, due to the grant of 40.32 and 48.1 million dollar FAD loans, respectively, that 
almost tripled their receptions of Spanish aid in 2002. 
 
In fifth place, Vietnam (VNM) received in 2001 an aid-quota 20% smaller than the predicted 
one. This country has only taken part in the Spanish aid for two years with quotas greater than 
1%: in 1998, due to the grant of a 10.79 million FAD loan (99.4% of the donor’s aid 
disbursed to Vietnam), and in 2001, with another loan of 5.38 million (76.5% of the ODA). 
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All in all, the characteristics of these outliers point to three conclusions: firstly, there is an 
obvious divergence of geographical priorities between the concessional loan scheme 
(independently managed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade) and the rest of the 
Spanish bilateral ODA. Secondly, most of the outliers are cases of “over-allocation” (in 
comparison with the historical pattern identified by the model), which indicates that these 
observations are causing an “over-prediction” of the parameters showed in Table 7; this way, 
the allocation bias that favours those countries with relatively higher income levels and 
population sizes is reinforced by the presence of outliers among middle-income and highly 
populated countries, such as China, Indonesia and Turkey. Finally, it stands out that, in spite 
of the erratic –in terms of developmental criteria, but not in terms of the donor’s economic 
interests– allocation pattern detected with this group of partners, the current Aid Plan includes 
all of them in some of the three levels of geographical priorities: this way, Vietnam figures 
among the “high-priority countries”, Indonesia among the “areas with special attention” –due 
to having suffered the 2004 Tsunami– and China, Serbia-Montenegro and Turkey among the 
“preferential regions” –these last two as beneficiaries of the Stability Pact for Southeast 
Europe–. Among these 5 countries, only Vietnam is not a middle-income economy. 
 
Regarding the countries with post-colonial links, 20 observations had residuals greater than 
|0.6| (Table 10). Among them, 5 outliers had a special influence in the estimation (with 
residuals greater than |0.8 |): 
 




| code         a       t     a_hat        resid    GDPpct-2      POBt-2       EXPt-1      FDIt-1  | 
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  ARG   10.94641   1995    5.707275    .6778482   11174.36   3.39e+07   1.218057   594.4139 | 
|  ARG   1.061423   2002    4.826903   -.7751808   12173.68   3.69e+07   .5749757   23000.98 | 
|  BOL   2.170838   1997    -.186064   -.7786487   2265.805    7481694   .0374985   35.01234 | 
|  BOL   2.898095   1999    -.065771   -.6100017   2356.471    7813387   .0612191   77.01134 | 
|  COL   1.041584   1994    6.321113    -1.36991   6150.435   3.64e+07   .3108127   57.83556 | 
|  COL   4.187877   2001    5.720581    .6220736    6106.98   4.14e+07   .1980391   2816.104 | 
|  CRI   1.119415   2003   -3.118248   -.6751104   8257.619    4014435   .0994604     59.945 | 
|  DOM   1.366938   1995   -.0545994   -.7124659    4575.27    7442183   .1104007   44.34831 | 
|  DOM   4.050961   2004    -.349151    .6684666    6754.03    8513900   .1610744   632.1388 | 
|  ECU   8.630158   1996    1.459267    .6776907   3340.331   1.12e+07    .113951   67.82926 | 
|  SLV   5.515272   2001   -1.451301    .6655865   4602.782    6157863   .0507957   118.0318 | 
|  SLV   6.658564   2002   -1.373508    .7761761   4594.274    6280482    .057532   153.2376 | 
|  GTM   1.153403   1995    .9177209   -.7068531   3509.873    9526771   .0427263   30.48366 | 
|  MEX   24.39601   1993    10.33084    1.315734   7758.041   8.48e+07   1.501187   105.6611 | 
|  MEX   19.59025   1994    10.57532    .8518648   7884.847   8.64e+07   1.940295    129.338 | 
|  MEX   1.083921   2005    9.437422    -.904687   8784.444   1.02e+08   1.556524   14789.53 | 
|  MAR   9.083199   2004    5.636839    .7883205    3728.44   2.85e+07    1.34841   1947.854 | 
|  PHL   1.397365   2005    8.852309   -.6709189   4074.524   8.02e+07    .104007    347.809 | 
|  VEN   1.146358   1996    3.964651   -.6369036   6068.425   2.16e+07   .2935037   183.3131 | 
|  VEN   4.258585   2000    3.823938    .8161561   6153.747   2.34e+07   .2746032   1054.325 | 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Notes:  
* Observsations with  | | > 8  jt u ˆ
 a_hat: predicted aid-quota 
 
Firstly, the case of Mexico (MEX) stands out as it received 24.4% of the Spanish ODA in 
1993, and 19.6% in 1994, which was well above the predicted quotas, due to the FAD loans 
granted gradually since 1992 (which amounted to 162.65, 216.69 and 144.65 million dollars 
in 1992, 1993 and 1994, respectively). Although in the 10 following years Mexico has 
received additional loans for 14.33 million dollars, the magnitudes disbursed at the beginning 
of the 1990s explain its position as a “long-term debtor” of the Spanish assistance, as well as 
the existence of another atypical observation in 2005, in this case due to an aid “infra-
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Secondly, Venezuela (VEN) in 2000 received an aid-quota greater than the predicted one, 
again due to the grant of a FAD loan that amounted to 21.39 million dollars (77.1% of the 
Spanish aid disbursed to this country). 
 
Other outliers of smaller influence in the analysis belong to Argentina (ARG, 2002 for the 
revitalization of ODA disbursements experienced during the economic crisis), Bolivia (BOL, 
1997 and 1999, for the decrease in aid disbursements that especially affected the FAD loans), 
El Salvador (SLV, 2002, due to the grant of 31.54 million dollars of FAD loans, 57% of their 
aid that year) and Morocco (MAR, 2004, which tripled the 2003 quota, mainly due to the 
disbursement of further grants). 
 
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the proposed model predicts negative aid-quotas for 
several countries with colonial past. Since the endogenous variable (gross disbursements) is 
strictly positive, these results should be interpreted as null quotas. These are the cases, among 
the outliers, of Bolivia in 1997 and 1999, the Dominican Republic in 1995 and 2004, El 
Salvador in 2001 and 2002, and Costa Rica in 2003, which are relatively small countries (with 
less than 9 million inhabitants), with low shares in the Spanish exports (less than 0.16%) and 
relatively high stock of Spanish investment (being these, precisely, the variables that 
determine the allocation). Costa Rica is, also, one of the ex-colonies with highest income 
levels. 
 
Among these countries with predicted negative ODA-quotas, the most singular one is 
Equatorial Guinea (vid Graph 3b). Although it is not an outlier in terns of the value of its 
residuals (which is the reason why it is not included in Table 10), the model predicts negative 
quotas in every single year, due to its small population size (it is the smallest country in the 
sample, with less than half million inhabitants), limited share of the Spanish exports and 
relatively high income per capita (above 10,000 dollars since 1999). Hence its aid-quotas 
between 1993 and 2003 have been actually fairly limited (of less than 1.9%)
63. 
 
Finally, two additional tests have been carried out, verifying the overall significance of those 
irrelevant variables at a 90% confidence level (vid variables with p-values greater than 0.1 in 
Tables 7 and 8). The results of the corresponding Wald tests (Tables 11 a and b) for each 
estimation (countries with and without Spanish colonial past) verify whether the coefficients 
of these variables are simultaneously equal to zero. In both cases these hypotheses are not 
rejected, being especially worrisome the fact that democracy levels have not exerted 
significant influences in the allocation, not even when jointly considered with other 









                                                 
63 Nevertheless, Equatorial Guinea is not included in the panel data set in the years 2004 and 2005, due to the 
lack of information on per capita income. In spite of being classified as a least developed country, the CIA’s 
database estimates a per capita GDP (PPP) of 50,200 dollars in 2005, due to the abundant oil revenues. If this 
data were included in the model, the country would figure as a clear outlier in the last years, given the increase in 
its aid-quotas, which rose to 3.1% in 2004 and 1.9% in 2005, more than duplicating the previous year’s ones. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 39 
 
Tables 11. Wald tests of joint significance of the irrelevant variables 
 
a)  Countries without post-colonial links: 
 
H0:  lnDRt-2 = lna_others =  P2t-1 = 0 
Χ
2(3) = 2.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.4624 
 
b)  Countries with post-colonial links: 
 
H0: lnDRt-2 = lna_others = P2t-1 = lnACt-2 = 0 
F(4, 165) = 0.40 
Prob > F = 0.8083 
 
In order to check the robustness of the results and reduce the bias that stems from the 
inclusion of irrelevant variables, both models are re-estimated excluding the non-significant 
regressors (Tables 12 a and b). These new estimations corroborate that the results showed in 
Tables 7 and 8 are reasonably robust, showing very limited variations of the estimated 
coefficients and –more importantly– being consistent in their signs. 
 
Tables 12. Sensitivity test. Estimation excluding the irrelevant variables 
 
a)  Countries without post-colonial links: 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       121 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        26 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1466                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.5033                                        avg =       4.7 
       overall = 0.5357                                        max =        13 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =     64.89 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lna  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |   .5810232    .120022     4.84   0.000     .3457843     .816262 
     lnPOBt-2 |   .3160071   .0598542     5.28   0.000     .1986951    .4333191 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .1488598   .0567002     2.63   0.009     .0377293    .2599902 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.3653635   .0753269    -4.85   0.000    -.5130015   -.2177254 
      lnCAt  |   .4010279   .0974541     4.12   0.000     .2100213    .5920344  -2
       _cons |  -7.986398   1.725883    -4.63   0.000    -11.36907   -4.603729 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .21611769 
     sigma_e |  .43405264 
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b)  Countries with post-colonial links: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       193 
Group variable (i): n                           Number of groups   =        20 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2537                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.2679                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.1032                                        max =        13 
                                                F(4,169)           =     13.21 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9961                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lna  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lnGDPpct-2 |  -.4820266   .0868162    -5.55   0.000    -.6534106   -.3106426 
     lnPOBt-2 |   3.872101   .7156634     5.41   0.000     2.459309    5.284892 
     lnEXPt-1 |   .3423339   .0807648     4.24   0.000     .1828962    .5017717 
     lnFDIt-1 |  -.2612989   .0596405    -4.38   0.000    -.3790353   -.1435625 
       _cons |  -55.48891   10.97694    -5.06   0.000     -77.1585   -33.81933 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.7508669 
     sigma_e |  .41677383 





The geographical allocation of Spanish aid has been little studied by the specialized literature, 
despite the fact that it is unusually concentrated on middle-income countries. The present 
analysis contributes additional elements to understand this peculiar middle-income specialization, 
offering statistical evidence which points out that the geographical orientation of the ODA has not 
been specially determined by “altruistic” criteria –i.e. development promotion and poverty 
reduction, as the Spanish International Co-operation Law advocates–, but neither by merely “self-
interest” criteria –the promotion of Spain’s foreign policy conveniences–. Consequently, the 
resource allocation has followed a “hybrid” pattern, although it does not seem to have considered 
those aspects related to the partners’ levels of democracy and absorptive capacities. 
 
However, this general conclusion should be clarified, distinguishing the two-decision stages 
of the geographical ODA allocation: 
   
Regarding the selection process of aid-partners, the analysis shows an insufficient 
developmental orientation: 
 
i)  Spain’s assistance has been strongly influenced by the historical –colonial– links; as 
a result, the odds ratio of being selected as an aid-partner for a former colony virtually 
assures its participation in the ODA. Furthermore, aid allocations have supported 
Spain’s trade interests. 
ii)  The aid’s path dependence has exerted an outstanding influence in the selection process, 
conferring certain “stability” over-time on the list of partner countries. This result responds to 
several factors: firstly, the interest to co-operate with a stable group of countries so as to 
minimize the aid administrative costs; secondly, the possible existence of “learning 
economies” in the donor’s administration; thirdly, the efforts carried out by Spain in order to 
build a greater management capacity in those countries prioritized by the Aid Plan, which 
determines their future probabilities of selection and, in the end, their permanency in the list of 
high-priority partners; fourthly, the responsibility of providing sufficiently stable aid so as to 
generate sustainable development processes; fifthly, the identification of previous experiences QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 41 
 
where aid was shown to be specially effective; and, finally, the outstanding importance played 
by long-run political commitments between donor and recipient in the allocation process. 
iii) The Spanish ODA reveals to have been directed with greater probability to the countries 
highly benefited by the global aid system, but without considering other factors of the 
recipients’ needs (such the relative levels of per capita income, population sizes and death 
rates). The conjunction of both results fails to fulfil –in certain cases– the humanitarian 
allocation approach, and shows the –well-known– lack of international coordination in the 
definition of the geographical areas of the donors’ interventions, taking place the so-called 
“bandwagon effect” in the selection process, which can reinforce the existence of aid 
“darlings” and “orphan” regions, and the excessive fragmentation of the Spanish policies. 
iv)  On the other hand, other aspects related to the partners’ governance have not played a 
relevant role in the selection process, which contrasts with the proclaimed Spanish support for 
democracy and humans’ rights. 
 
Regarding the geographical allocation of the aid-quotas among the previously selected aid-
partners, the analysis differentiates between two groups of countries in terms of the geographical 
areas of interests for Spain –evaluated by means of the post-colonial links–, identifying two notably 
different allocation patterns (Graph 4): 
 
Graph 4. Relative elasticities: ¿how much does the aid-quota vary when a partner country 




























The allocation among the group of countries without post-colonial links with Spain reveals that, 
until a recent period, the Spanish co-operation system lacked a clear selectivity –pro-
developmental– strategy: 
 
i)  The allocation has not been strictly guided by the recipients’ need levels; instead, it has 
especially benefited those partners with higher per capita incomes, although it has also 
rewarded the most populated ones. 
ii)  The aid allocation has reinforced the Spanish trade interests. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 42 
 
iii)  The Spanish investors’ interests have been negatively related to the aid allocations, 
and, at the same time, countries with high rates of aid-dependency have tended to 
receive more resources. This allocation pattern towards the high aid-dependent 
economies that receive lower foreign investments may be compensating the scarce 
Spanish provision of financial resources through the disbursement of further aid. 
iv)  The allocation pattern has not considered in an appropriate way other factors related to 
the partner countries’ levels of democracy and respect for civil and political rights. 
v)  The presence of a certain number of outliers in the analysis evidences the divergence 
between the geographical interests of the FAD loan scheme (independently administrated by 
the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade) and the rest of the Spanish bilateral ODA. Also, 
it highlights that, in spite of this erratic –in terms of development goals– allocation pattern, 
the current Aid Plan is trying to include some of these outlier countries within the Spanish co-
operation strategy. 
 
Regarding the group of countries with post-colonial links, Spain has had a more progressive and 
balanced pattern of allocation in comparison with the previous group of recipients, although some 
notes of caution should be made: 
 
vi)  The ODA allocation has been sensitive to the different levels of economic development 
and population sizes of the partners, which discards the existence of both a regressive 
distribution bias, and a small countries bias. 
vii)  However, it has especially favoured Spain’s main trade partners; this priority has not 
coincided with the geographical interests of the investors, who have tended to concentrate 
their resources in those countries that received less aid –and have greater income levels. 
viii)  The allocation has not either been especially selective regarding the absorptive 
capacities of the former colonies, and the levels of democracy and respect for political rights –
in spite of being this the group of countries with which Spain shares a greater cultural likeness 
and is able to exert a greater influence. 
ix)  The existence of a certain number of outliers points out the cases of “over-
allocations” in comparison with the historical distributional pattern depicted by the 
model. Most of these atypical observations stem from the divergent geographical 
interests of the FAD loans. 
 
The identification of a hybrid pattern in the case of the Spanish aid allocation coincides with 
the results obtained by previous studies (Alonso, 1999; Sánchez Alcázar, 1999; Berthèlemy 
and Tichit, 2002; Alesina and Weder, 2002; and Isopi and Mavrotas, 2006), which estimated 
different weights of the RN and DI factors, but agreed by pointing out the importance of the 
foreign policy interests and the insufficient attention paid to issues related to the recipient 
Governments’ governance. 
 
All in all, the concurrence of self foreign policy interests and developmental motivations 
identified in the Spanish aid geographical specialization does not have to infringe the main 
goal of supporting the progress of developing countries, but, rather, the synergies of these 
different motivations should be channelled so that they redound in a full conception of 
“partnership” between recipients and donor. Nevertheless, given the strong specialization in 
those countries with greater cultural affinities with Spain, the geographical priorities should 
be defined in a clearer and more selective way, explicitly including considerations about the 
capacity of effectively using the resources –both on the part of the recipients, and on the part 
of the donor–, as well as the existence of sound governance policies and institutions in the 
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The insufficient progressiveness of the Spanish allocation is mainly driven by the influence of 
the post-colonial links; links that are, in a certain way, “revitalized” and “re-updated” by 
means of the international assistance. Nevertheless, post-colonial links have characterized the 
allocation patterns of all donor countries that were colonial metropolises. The peculiarity of 
the Spanish case is that the countries that were part of its Empire have, precisely, higher 
income levels than the former colonies of other European donors. This fact brings about the 
apparent regressive bias of the allocation, and blurs Spain’s commitment with the MDG and 
the special attention to the poorest countries. These historical links –which not only affect aid 
policies, but influence the entire Spanish foreign policy– have acquired a structural character 
for the partner economies, and represent a long-run political commitment of the Spanish 
State, thus stamping certain “persistence” on the aid geographical priorities. 
 
Nevertheless, these links have to be updated in order to develop “dynamic” co-operation 
partnerships, which should evolve as the relative necessities of the recipient countries change. 
Spain’s aid policy towards its ex-colonies have positively advanced in recent years, more 
clearly defining its geographical strategy and committing itself to concentrate the resources on 
the list of “high-priority” partners, which has been recently expanded to more relatively 
needed countries, thus shaping a process of –necessarily gradual– adaptation of its 
international specialization. Moreover, Spain has improved its co-operation strategy with 
middle-income countries, advocating for a greater specialization of the interventions, 
according to the levels of development of the partners. 
 
Regarding the most heterogeneous group of developing countries without historical links to 
Spain, the developmentally undefined aid allocation strategy is due to –to a large extent– the 
excessive fragmentation of the resources and the divergent geographical interests of the 
concessional FAD loan scheme. However, Spain has recently added some of these countries 
to its regional priorities, integrating them in the resource’s planning and evaluation cycle. 
Although this has implied an increase in the number of prioritized countries –which, in the 
end, determines the level of dispersion–, this process can contribute to strengthen the 
effectiveness and reduce the excessive aid fragmentation, as long as the bulk of the resources 
is reallocated to the 54 economies prioritized by the Aid Plan –classified in three different 
levels of priority–, and where Spain’s co-operation has better chances of optimizing its 
resources in terms of developmental outcomes. Furthermore, the policies carried out in the 
broad group of partners receiving marginal aid-quotas needs to be more selective, specific and 
clearly oriented towards contributing to overcome their peculiar situations of vulnerability. 
 
Regarding the FAD loans, although their participation in Spanish aid has been considerably 
reduced, it is still necessary to integrate their geographic priorities within the whole co-
operation strategy, which in turn implies a greater co-ordination between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and C-operation –genuine co-ordinator of the Spanish aid– and the Ministry 
of Industry, Trade and Tourism –responsible for the loan scheme. 
 
The integrated RN–DI model for the Spanish ODA proposed in this paper contributes some 
methodological advantages. Firstly, it develops an allocation model adapted to the political 
and management peculiarities of the Spanish official co-operation system, thus offering more 
precise interpretations than “standardized” models. Secondly, it uses a wide panel data set that 
covers the last 13 years of Spanish assistance to 104 developing economies. Thirdly, it 
appropriately considers the censored nature of the dependent variable, both analysing the 
decision of selecting aid partners, and the decision of allocating aid-quotas. Fourthly, it uses a 
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former colonies, the inertia of the allocations, and the information lags faced by the aid 
policy-makers. 
 
A few words of caution are worth mentioning since there is a series of inherent limitations to the 
study of the geographical aid allocation: 
 
Firstly, in spite of the increasing sophistication of the econometric procedures available for the 
analysis, it is complicated to control the different factors of heterogeneity existing among the aid 
receiving countries; heterogeneity that is not only captured by the variables included in the model, 
but is also present in the different capacities of the recipients economies to efficiently take advantage 
of external resources, the existence of difficult aid partnership relations  between donor and 
recipients, as well as other qualitative variables of difficult quantification –such as ethical and 
institutional factors, political affinities, the existence of immigrant lobbies in the donor country, etc.–
. Furthermore, it should be born in mind that the eventual allocation of aid is contingent on its 
fungible character, which hinders, in some circumstances, the assurance that the resources disbursed 
to the neediest countries finally benefit their poorest citizens
64. 
 
Moreover, it would be necessary to consider, in the particular case of Spain, that the recent 
escalation of the immigration flows may constitute a decisive variable in the evolution of the pattern 
of aid giving, which may be affected by the arrival of immigrants of nationalities different from 
those historically linked with Spain
65. 
 
Secondly, this paper contributes an analytical model of the geographical aid specialization that 
allows the identification of the particular –current– orientations of the official Spanish co-operation 
and assesses them with respect to the –by law– aid strategy and the international commitments and 
consensus ratified by Spain. However, although the model identifies different types of determinants 
that capture the heterogeneous interests that are present in the allocation, it does not control other 
“qualitative” aspects of aid, such as its composition –grants and loans; tied status; etc.–, its sectorial 
distribution, the use of appropriate aid instruments, the efficiency levels of the different 
interventions, the donor’s self-capacity to usefully administrate the disbursed resources, etc. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the definition of a more effective strategy of Spanish ODA 
geographical specialization will also require a greater co-ordination among the donors’ 
international community, which should aim to avoid the existence of aid “darlings” and 
“orphan” countries, as well as taking advantage of the synergies of the different donors’ 
interventions, allowing less fragmentation of the Spanish resources and greater effectiveness 
of the interventions. 
 
7.  REFERENCES 
 
ALESINA, A. and DOLLAR, D. (1998): “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?”, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 6612. 
ALESINA, A., and WEDER, B. (2002): “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign 
Aid?”, American Economic Review, 92 (4), pp. 1126-37. 
                                                 
64 See the studies on aid fungibility of Feyzioglu et al. (1998), Devarajan and Swaroop (1998) and Pack and Pack 
(2003). 
65 Lahiri and Raimondos-M∅ller (2000) developed and aid allocation model focusing on the influence exerted 
by the different immigrant nationalities present in the donor country. Nevertheless, in the case of Spain, the 
information that facilitates the State Secretary of Immigration and Emigration does not offer complete time 
series data on the immigrants’ countries of origin, which is limited to the most recent years. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 45 
 
ALONSO, J.A. (1999): “Especialización sectorial y geográfica de la ayuda española”, Revista 
de Información Comercial Española, 778, pp. 119–142. 
ALONSO, J.A. (2003): “Globalización, desigualdad internacional y eficacia de la ayuda”, in 
ALONSO, J.A. and FITZGERALD, V. (Eds.): Financiación del desarrollo y 
coherencia en las políticas de los donantes, Catarata, Madrid. 
BERTHÉLEMY, J.C. and TICHIT, A. (2002): “Bilateral donor’s aid allocation decisions”, 
UNU-WIDER Discussion paper Nº 2002/123. 
BOE (BOLETÍN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO) (1998): Ley 23/1998, de 7 de julio, de 
Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, Nº 162. 
BULIR, A. and HAMANN, J.A. (2003): “Aid volatility: an empirical assessment”, IMF Staff 
Papers, vol. 50 (1), pp. 64–88. 
BURNSIDE, C. and DOLLAR, D. (1997): “Aid, policies and growth”, World Bank Working 
Paper, Nº 1777, Washington DC. 
BURNSIDE, C. and DOLLAR, D. (2000): “Aid, policies and growth: revisiting the 
evidence”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Nº 3251, Washington DC. 
CANAVIRE, G., NENNENKAMP, P., THIELE, R. and TRIVEÑO, L. (2005): “Assessing 
the Allocation of Aid: Development Concerns and the Self-Interest of Donors”, Kiel 
Working Paper No. 1253, Kiel Institute for World Economics. 
CHANG, C.C., FERNANDEZ-ARIAS, E. and SERVEN, L. (1998): Measuring Aid Flows, A 
New Approach, World Bank, Washington DC, in:  
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64166093&pagePK=641652
59&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=469382&repNo=WPS2050. 
COLLIER, P. and DOLLAR, D. (2001): “Can the world cut poverty in half? How policy 
reform and effective aid can meet international development goals”, World 
Development, 29 (11), pp. 1787–1802. 
COLLIER, P. and DOLLAR, D. (2002): “Aid allocation and poverty reduction”, European 
Economic Review, 26, pp. 1475–1500. 
DEVARAJAN, S. y SWAROOP, V. (1998): “The implications of foreign aid fungibility for 
development assistance”, Policy Research Working Paper 2002, World Bank. 
DOLLAR, D. and LEVIN, V. (2004): “The Increasing Selectivity of Foreign Aid, 1984-
2002”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3299, World Bank, Washington DC. 
DUDLEY, L. and MONTMARQUETTE, C. (1976): “A model of the supply of bilateral 
foreign aid”, American Economic Review, 66 (1), pp. 132–142. 
FEYZIOGLU, T., SWAROOP, V. y ZHU, M. (1998): “A panel data analysis of the 
fungibility of foreign aid”, World Bank Economic Review, 12, nº 1, pp. 29–58 
FEENY, S. (2003): “What determines foreign aid to Papua New Guinea? An inter-temporal 
model of aid allocation”, UNU-WIDER discussion paper No. WDP 2003/05:1-37, 
UNU-WIDER. 
FEENY, S., and MCGILLIVRAY, M. (2002): “Modelling inter-temporal aid allocation”, 
CREDIT, No. 02/10:[1]-24, University of Nottingham. 
ISOPI, A. and MAVROTAS, G. (2006): “Aid allocation and aid effectiveness: an empirical 
analysis”, UNU-WIDER Discussion paper Nº 2006/07. 
JONES, S., RIDDELL, R. and KOTOGLOU, K. (2005): “Aid Allocation Criteria: Managing 
for Development Results and Difficult Partnerships”, paper presented at The Oxford 
Policy Management en DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships, 
in: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/60/34255668.pdf.  
LAHIRI, S. and RAIMONDOS-M∅LLER, P. (2000): “Lobbying by ethnic gropus and aid 
allocation”, The Economic Journal, 12 (9), pp. 879–900. 
LEVITT, M.S. (1968): “The allocation of economic aid in practice”, The Manchester School 
of Economics and Social Studies, 36 (2), pp. 131–147. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 46 
 
MAE (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación) (2005): Plan Director de la 
Cooperación Española 2005-2008, in: 
http://www.aeci.es/03coop/4program_coop/vita/docs/ftp/PlanDirector_CE_2005-
2008.pdf 
MAE (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación) (various years): Seguimiento PACI, 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, SECI, Madrid. 
MAIZELS, A. and NISSANKE, M.K. (1984): “Motivations for aid to developing countries”, 
World Development, 12 (9), pp. 879–900. 
MANNING, W.G., DUAN, N. and ROGERS, W.H. (1987): “Monte Carlo evidence on the 
choice between sample selection and two-part models”, Journal of Econometrics, 35, 
pp. 59-82. 
MARSHALL, M.G. and JAGGERS, K. (2005): Polity IV Project: political regime 
characteristics and transitions, Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, 
George Manson University, in http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. (2003a): “Descriptive and prescriptive analyses of aid allocations. 
Approaches, issues and consequences”, UNU-WIDER Discussion paper Nº 2003/21. 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. (2003b): “Modelling aid allocation”, UNU-WIDER Discussion paper 
Nº 2003/49. 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. (2003c): “Aid effectiveness and selectivity”, UNU-WIDER Discussion 
paper Nº 2003/71. 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. (2006): “Aid allocation and fragile States”, UNU-WIDER Discussion 
paper Nº 2006/01. 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. and OCZKOWSKI, E. (1992): “A two-part sample selection model of 
British bilateral aid allocation”, Applied Economics, 24, pp. 1311–1319. 
MCGILLIVRAY, M. and WHITE, H. (1994): “Development criteria for the allocation and 
aid and assessment of donor performance”, CREDIT Research Paper Nº 94/7, 
University of Nottingham, Nottingham. 
MCKINLAY, R.D. and LITTLE, R. (1977): “A foreign policy model of US bilateral aid 
allocation”, World Politics, XXX (1), pp. 58–86. 
NEUMAYER, E. (2003): The pattern of aid giving: the impact of good governance on 
development assistance, Routledge, London. 
OECD: CAD (2002), Development co-operation review: Spain, OECD, Development 
Assistance Committee, Paris. 
PACK, H. y PACK, J. (2003): “Foreign aid and the question of fungibility”, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, pp. 423–437. 
SÁNCHEZ ALCÁZAR, E.J. (1999), “Modelos de distribución de la ayuda: el caso español”, 
in ALONSO, J.A. and MOSLEY, P. (Eds.): La eficacia de la cooperación internacional 
al desarrollo: evaluación de la ayuda, Civitas Ediciones, Madrid. 
TARP, F., BACH, C.F., HANSEN, H. and BAUNSGAARD, S. (1999): “Danish aid policy. 
Theory and empirical evidence”, en GUPTA, K.L. (ed.), Foreign aid: new perspectives, 
Chapter 9, pp. 149-69, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts. 
TEZANOS, S. (2006): “¿Es progresiva la distribución geográfica de la ayuda española?”, 
Colección Escuela Diplomática, nº 10, pp. 131–166, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y 
Cooperación. 
TEZANOS, S. (2008): “Modelos teóricos y empíricos de asignación geográfica de la ayuda al 
desarrollo”, Principios, Estudios de Economía Política, nº 10 (forthcoming) 
TRUMBALL, W.N. and WALL, H.J. (1994): “Estimating aid-allocation criteria with panel 
data”, The Economic Journal, 104, pp. 876–82. 
WHITE, H. and MCGILLIVRAY, M. (1992): “Descriptive measures of the allocation of 
development aid”, ISS Working Paper Nº 125, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 47 
 
WHITE, H. and MCGILLIVRAY, M. (1995): “How well is aid allocated? Descriptive 
measures of aid allocation: a survey of methodology and results”, Development and 
Change, 26 (1), pp. 163–183. 
WORLD BANK (1998): Assessing aid. What works, what doesn’t, and why, Oxford 




CIA (2005), The World Fact Book, in: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
MARSHALL, M.G. and JAGGERS, K. (2005): Polity IV Project: political regime 
characteristics and transitions, Center for Global Policy, School of Public Policy, 
George Manson University, in http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 
MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA, TURISMO Y COMERCIO (2007), Registro de Inversión 
Española en el Exterior, in http://www.mityc.es/es-
ES/Servicios/IndicadoresE/sectorexterior/ 
OECD: DAC (2005), Development Database on Aid from DAC Members: DAC online, 
OECD.Stat, in: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
UNITED NATIONS (2005): COMTRADE, United Nations Publications, New York. 




The sources of each variable are detailed in Table 2. However, some remarks on the 
procedures for building the data are worth mentioning: 
 
The DAC database only provides with complete information on the geographical allocation of 
the Spanish ODA gross disbursements for 1996 onwards. Hence, the data for the period 
1992–96 was built by the author using the net disbursements reported in Table DAC.2a, 
detracting the item (205) “ODA loans received”, as well as the aggregate “emergency aid” 
and the “total debt relief”
66. 
 
Each developing country’s share on the Spanish exports is measured as the ratio of the total 
exports bought by the country to the annual aggregated Spanish exports. 
 
The stock of Spanish FDI in each developing country accumulated since 1993 uses the online 
database of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade. However, the data for the years 
1990−92 was compiled by the author from the monthly publication Boletín Económico ICE. 
  
The countries that were part of the Spanish colonial Empire, according to the CIA online 
database, are: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Philippines, Guatemala, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Morocco, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, Cuba is excluded of 
the analysis due to a lack of information; Equatorial Guinea was only excluded for the years 
2002−05. 
                                                 
66 In accordance with direct sources of the DAC, the total amount of debt relief includes the following items 
from Table DAC.2.a: (212) “debt forgiveness grants” + (214) “reorganised debt” + (215) “offsetting entries for 
debt relief”. Moreover, the item (94) “other action on debt” from Table DAC.1 should be also added up. 
However, there is not geographical detail to do so, although the DAC plans to report on this data for 2006 flows 
onwards. In any case, this item has had a very marginal importance in Spanish ODA. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS152   Page 48 
 
 
Finally, although there is a certain number of possible explanatory variables that approximate 
the recipients’ needs –such as the indebtness levels, poverty headcounts, inequality levels, 
etc.–, they were not included in the model since information redundancy causes 
multicolinearity problems among the independent variables. Furthermore, in order to control 
the estimation bias resulting from a non-random sample selection, the data needs to be widely 
available among developing countries. 
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Chart A.2. Developing countries included in the aid-quotas allocation stage (1993–2005) 
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